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ABSTRACT
This thesis compares the current drawdown in defense
budgets to those which occurred after World War II, Korea
and Vietnam. Each post-conflict period is examined with
respect to the Department of Defense and Department of the
Navy, comparing the degree and rate of reductions in
budgets, manning and ships. There are three principle
conclusions drawn from the research. First, that President
Eisenhower was uniquely successful among post-conflict
Presidents in maintaining the balance between force levels
and funding during post-conflict drawdowns. Second, that
the post-Vietnam "holiow forces" occurred when funding was
insufficient in the face of inflation to sustain the change
to the all volunteer force. Third, that early signs in the
current reduction point to the possibility of similar
difficulties in balancing reductions in forces and budgets.
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The Armed Forces of the United States have been reduced
following each major conflict of the past fifty years: World
War II, Korea, Vietnam. At the apparent end of the Cold War
we now face another period of retrenchment. The current
drawdown is only partially completed, but current trends
suggest that this will be a significant reduction of our
military forces. Indeed, it may be the most severe drawdown
since World War II. This thesis examines this drawdown in
the context of the previous defense budget drawdowns.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Three research questions are addressed.
1. What kind of reduction of the military has
occurred in each post-conflict period since 1940? What
is the extent and nature of the reduction?
2. What reasons were given by the decision makers for
the choices made during the drawdowns? Is each period
unique, solely the result of existing conditions and
motivations? Or, is there a pattern to the drawdown
process such that factors can be abstracted and
similarities between the separate post-conflict periods
identified?
3. Based on the lessons of past post-conflict
reductions and current trend lines, what can be expected
during the latest drawdown period?
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C. OBJECTIVE
This research identifies what has occurred to date in
the latest military drawdown, and what was done in each of
the four post-conflict periods. The reasons advanced for
the reductions are reviewed for the purpose of applying them
to the current period of reduction and to identify points of
similarity and difference among them.
D. SCOPE
The focus of the research is on the Navy and the
Department of Defense. The other services are mentioned as
necessary for comparison. Research covers both defense
budgets and force levels, and is centered around the annual
fiscal year Presidential budget requests and the actual
authorizations by Congress.
The potential depth of analysis for each individual
historical period is great. However, given the limitations
of time and resources, histories will not be exhaustive but
only sufficient to ascertain the stated objectives.
E. METHOD
Measures are taken of the reductions for each period.
Three variables are used for measuring the force level:
1. Money: budgetary dollars, including budget authority
and outlay, for both DOD and the Navy;
2. Equipment: ships, total and combatants;
3. People: personnel levels (uniformed).
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Anticipated scoring methods include:
1. degree of change (dollars, number, percentage);
2. rate of reduction (an amount divided by a period);
3. range of change (from peak to a trough over a period).
Analysis is drawn from comparisons with and among:
1. prior years;
2. total DOD and DON;
3. total government;
4. various economic and demographic measures, including
GNP, employment, interest rates, inflation, and
population.
F. SOURCES
Sources for the research include official statements,
publications and documents of the federal government and
officials, congressional testimony, and the recorded
statements and memoirs of participants. Historical records
were reviewed to survey the stated reasons of contemporary
decision makers for each period. Secondary sources were
sampled for retrospective analysis of the validity of those
justifications in light of subsequent events. The sources
for all budget figures, charts and tables are the official
budget documents of the United States, except where noted.
G. LIMITATIONS
Externalities are always significant factors in public
policy decisions. These include technological advances,
3
world events, and personalities. Their impact is difficult
to quantify, and their occurrence is random. They are
briefly acknowledged in later chapters where incident to
turning points in the defense budgets.
H. ORGANIZATION OF CHAPTERS
Chapter II., "Framing The Issue," establishes the
underlying competition between economic goals and defense
goals, setting the stage for the following chapters. It
briefly reviews the early history of military reductions,
and more clearly identifies the core, related issues,
including some beyond the scope of this research. A
sampling of the existing l 4 terature is provided.
Chapter III., "Post-Cold War," identifies the point from
which the current drawdown begins, details the force level
reductions by the Bush Administration during the period 1989
through 1992, and reports early actions by the Clinton
administration. The reduction is measured in accordance
with the procedures outlined in section E. above. The
various justifications advanced by participants are
chronicled. Chapters IV. through VI. repeat this procedure
for separate periods.
Chapter IV., "Post-World War II," addresses the
reductions of the period 1945--1949, covering the Truman
administration and ending with the Korean War.
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Chapter V., "Post-Korea," addresses the period
1953--1960, covering the Eisenhower administrations.
Chapter VI., "Post-Vietnam," addresses the period
1974--1979, and the Nixon, Ford and Carter administrations.
Specific attention os given the question of the "hollow
forces."
Chapter VII., "Conclusions," examines patterns,
similarities and differences among the periods. Conclusions
are made regarding common factors among all post-conflict
drawdowns, along with recommendations for future research.
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II. FRAMING THE ISSUE
This chapter reviews the cyclic history of America's
defense spending and sets the stage for the closer
examination of the four most recent examples in the
following chapters. It begins with an acknowledgement of
the fundamental competition between economic and military
power, and reports the early history of America's periodic
defense mobilization and demobilization. The drawdowns are
shown to be driven by both fiscal restraints and strategic
philosophy. A brief sample of the literature on defense
sizing introduces two perspectives on the proper level of
peacetime military forces: the pre-Cold War tradition of a
citizen army, and the more recent tradition of a
professional force and sustained readiness. These provide a
framework for the detailed analysis in following chapters.
The Reagan buildup is outlined to provide perspective on the
current drawdown. The chapter concludes by identifying the
conumon measures of defense spending, and applying them to an
overview of the four periods. Subsequent chapters then
focus on into each period separately, to more closely
illustrate and analyze the current drawdown.
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A. THE NATIONAL POWER EQUATION
In his history of the great powers, Paul Kennedy
addressed the question of why great powers rise and fall.
His conclusion was that throughout history a nation's power
has always been largely determined by the balance among its
military power, economic power and geography.
If that balance is lost, power decreases,
despite abundance in one of the two areas. National
security strategy must consider this balance.
(Kennedy, 1987, p. xv)
Economists acknowledge the inseparable nature of these two
competing national goals, defense and economy.
When it comes to the making of national policy,
two major issues dominate: defense policy and
economic policy. Since World War II these two
issues have been of overriding importance on our
national agenda.... Each is necessary for the
other. (Anderson, 1988, p. 58)
Americans want to be both powerful and prosperous. They
view defense as a necessity for which they will spend
accordingly, and they expect Presidents to determine the
safe level for defense spending, balanced with economic
prosperity. The symbiotic relationship between the military
and economy has been understood and managed by successful
administrations.
Besides the basic question of war or peace, the
most important question any modern President faces
is the size of the defense budget. Everything
else.. .is directly related to how much DOD spends.
(Ambrose, 1984, p. 88)
Periodic decisions by administrations to reverse the
direction of defense budgets have not been accidental. In
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his inauguration speech, President Kennedy told all the
nation's 0friends and foes alike" that we would pay any
price, bear any burden. Before taking office President
Reagan signaled the world that he would pay that price.
Early in 1979 he advertised his intention to build defense
expenditures to a projected cumulative increase of 69.8%
over five years.
TABLE 1. REAGAN CAMPAIGN PROPOSED DEFENSE BUDGETS
year spending increase
1981 $159 B ---
1982 $187 B 17.6%
1983 $212 B 13.4%
1894 $239 B 12.7%
1985 $270 B
(Source: Anderson, 1988, pp. 134-6)
B. A LONG HISTORY
America's tenure as the world's greatest military power
is a short one. Our martial history is a cycle of crisis,
mobilization, victory and subsequent demobilization.
Historian Barbara Tuchman identified three principles to
explain this phenomena, and how Americans view military
power:
1. unpreparedness until the eleventh hour;
2. undertaking the quickest feasible strategy to
victory;
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3. instant demobilization, no matter how inadvisable,
the moment hostilities are over.
Tuchman concluded that these were the result of a cultural
opposition to standing armies and noted that each war has
required a massive call to arms from the citizenry.
(Tuchman, 1982, pp. 5-8) The Continental Army evaporated
within two months of signing a preliminary peace. The
United States entered the Mexican War with only 4,000 men
and twelve field guns. Before the War Between the States,
the United States had attained world class economic power,
but the army consisted of only 26,000 men. President
Lincoln unbalanced the power equation and borrowed heavily
to conquer the Confederacy, acquiring and employing military
forces for a purely political purpose--the preservation of
the union. The Civil War transformed the nation for the
first time into the greatest military power on earth
(Kennedy, 1987, p. 179). America then disarmed, except for
the requirements of the Indian wars in the west. World War
I required a massive mobilization of manpower, and for the
second time, by 1918 the U.S. was "indisputably the
strongest Power in the world." (Kennedy, 1987, p.xix) By
1940. that army was reduced to only the 19th largest in the
world, with only a bit over 100,000 men in uniform, less
than 500 machine guns and less than 50 tanks, and George
Marshall, Army Chief-of-Staff, complained about this
aversion to maintaining the army during peacetime.
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They'll spend billions to fight the war, but will not
spend a few millions to prevent one (American
Experience, Marshall, 1993).
C. THE POST-WAR DENATE
Whether we would spend sufficiently during peace to
prevent wars, and how we would determine that sufficiency
occupied the country between conflicts in the 1950's, 1970's
and 1980's. Each peace-time administration wrestled with
the power equation balance. President Eisenhower relied on
nuclear deterrence as a cheaper defense. President Nixon
resorted to the all volunteer force as the answer.
President Carter's pursued diplomacy and high ideals in lieu
of combat operations, but high inflation and interest rates,
the Iranian hostage crisis, and low defense readiness led to
his defeat in 1980. President Reagan simultaneously
embraced the objectives of a robust domestic economy and the
strongest possible national defense. His defense goals were
met, but with unforseen fiscal effects. Revenue receipts of
1981 fell, leading to larger than anticipated deficits,
later compounded by increased defense spending (Schick,
1991, pp. 70-78). When the budget deficits rose, and he had
to chose between life-long values of fiscal conservatism and
a st. ng defense, Reagan never hesitated--defense spending
would go forward.
The defense budget cannot be determined by other
programs; what we spend on defense is what we must spend
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to maintain our national security. (Reagan, as quoted by
Anderson, 1988, pp. 335-336)
Reagan's call for a defense buildup was popular with the
electorate and supported by many strategic thinkers,
including those who formed the Committee on the Present
Danger to criticize the Carter neglect of defenses.
(Callahan, 1990, p. 388)








(Source: The Gallop Poll, 1991)
The 1990 rating was Gallop's highest ever for any
institution.
D. THE CURRENT DRAWDOWN DEBATE
The Soviet empire unraveled in 1991 and with it the
defined military threat. The Department of Defense "Base
Force" concept was designed by the Bush administration to
counter the remaining threats via gradual and modest defense
cuts against budget baseLiaes. Now, in the 1990's, faced
with increased economic competition from Japan and Western
Europe, and steady demands by the American public for
domestic programs and deficit reduction, military spending
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is seen as a cause of budget woes. With military power
seemingly less useful in the post-Cold War world, defense
budgets are a target for *peace dividends., Some agree with
Kennedy's prediction that America is entering a period of
decline in its effective world power, despite its status as
the only military superpower, and he cautioned against
excessive defense spending.
This does not mean, however, that a nation's
relative economic and military power will rise and
fall in parallel .... [It is] likely to find itself
spending much more on defense than it did two
generations earlier. (Kennedy, 1987, p. xxiii)
Adelman and Augustine acknowledge the linkage of
economic health and national security, but deny its
applicability to America's current situation (Adelman, 1990,
pp. 77-78). They refer to the work of RAND economist
Charles Wolf, who discounts the view that America is in a
decline, when a longer, pre-World War II view is considered
(Adelman, 1990, p. 83). Economist Charles Schultze directly
disputed notions the United States can not afford the kinds
of defense spending it needs.
The United States is fortunate in having an
economy that, with proper policies, can adjust to
about as high or as low a level of defense spending
as the nation and its leaders think proper (Ravenal,
1984, p. 4).
Ravenal goes further, and specifically states that strategy,
and never fiscal issues, should guide defense budgets
(Ravenal, 1984, p. 8).
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Beyond the size of the defense budgets are arguments
about force composition, and concerns about large, but
"hollow" forces (Adelman, 1990, pp. 106-107). 1 A hollow
force is relatively larger than its infrastructure supports,
and occurs when funding is out of balance with force levels.
The example is the post-Vietnam Navy, when ship readiness
fell to where ships could not put to sea.
Ideas for preventing hollow forces include reliance on
reserve components in lieu of larger active forces, and
increased funding for research and development of weapon
systems. The Bush administration's Base Force included
both. History is replete with military failures around
these factors.
... Defeat [came] upon those societies which failed to
modernize their military systems, and which lacked the
broad-based industrial infrastructure to support the
vast armies and much more expensive and complicated
weaponry (Kennedy, 1987, p. xviii).
The direct method for preventing a hollow force is
reducing personnel levels and commitments in line with
budget cuts. As noted, demobilization of troops was common
after all conflicts through World War II, and to a lessor
extent after Korea and Vietnam. The current drawdown is
different because of the all volunteer force. Ravenal
argues strongly for proportional cuts in personnel and
funding during the current drawdown.
SSee Ullman, 1991, and Tritten, 1991, for comprehensive
discussion of force composition.
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There is only one way to cut defense--that is, for
more than one or two seasons, or without hopelessly
unbalancing the forces.. .that is by cutting force
structures (Ravenal, 1984, pp. 8, 15-29).
He cautioned that this would also entail reducing the
military missions. Yet during the recent spending cuts,
tasking has been constant, heavy and scattered
geographically. Naval task forces continue to cover the
Persian Gulf, Somalia, and Bosnia simultaneously.
R. TWO VIEWS OF DEFENSE MOBILIZATION
Positions on defense spending can be reduced to two
opposing camps. One calls for a return to the traditional
citizen army; the other wants a sustained professional
force. It is helpful to summarize these and illustrate them
with simple models before closely examining each of the past
drawdowns in detail.
Under VIEW ONE, America should have a small standing
military, far less than one percent mobilization of the
labor force. (Figure 1) Augmentation by reserve forces and
a draft are preferable to a highly paid and provisioned
military and reduce the industrial-military complex.
Foreign aid and diplomatic efforts are more efficient peace-
keeping devices. This view resists arbitrary funding
floors, but generally suggests defense spending around 10
percent of federal outlays, and less than three percent of
GNP--$150 billion 1993 dollars. Graphically, VIEW ONE is a
14
lower, level plane, punctuated by occasional peaks in
response to crisis and military hostilities, after which
post-conflict spending and mobilization return to the former
low level state. The Cold War is seen as a forty year, non-
shooting war that ended with the dissolution of the USSR.
The military forces maintained during 1945-1990 are no
longer required, high defense spending hurts the nation's
fiscal health, and defense dollars must now be shifted to
non-military purposes.








Figure 1. View ONES Pre-WW2 Mobilization Model
Under VIEW TWO (Figure 2), World War II permanently
changed America's international role, such that pre-war
comparisons are invalid. A permanent state of high
military readiness must be sustained to control lessor
conflicts, intersecting them before they precipitate larger
wars. The end of the Cold War did not change the equation.
Indeed, military spending defeated the USSR and if
continued, it will support future national security goals.
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Defense budgets should remain near five percent of GNP and
20 percent of total expenditures. Active duty mobilization
should be about one percent of the labor force.
Graphically, VIEW TWO is a readiness plane higher than
conflict peaks. There should be no troughs, because history
shows that demobilization precipitates conflict, as enemies
challenge weakness and competitors fill any vacuum of
leadership. Economic health is a by-product of military
spending, which primes the domestic economic engine,
producing jobs and technological advances. Prevention is
cheaper than a cure.




conflicts handled vhile smaller
Figure 2. View TWO: Post-Cold War Mobilization
Model
F. THE REAGAN BUILDUP
By definition, each cyclical period of post-conflict
reduction of the armed forces must have been preceded by
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some period of expansion. The most recent expansion began
at the end of the Carter administration and continued
through both Reagan terms. Compared to other buildups,
which occurred incident to overt hostilities, Reagan's was
lower in magnitude but sustained in line with a VIEW TWO-
type perspective. Budget authority peaked in 1985 while
outlays lagged behind, peaking and leveling in 1989. As
shown in Figure 3, defense budget authority rose 129 percent
in nominal dollars from the prior trough (1979) to the peak.
Adjusted for inflation, that was still an impressive 57
percent. From 1979 to their peak, defense outlays rose 156
percent in nominal dollars and 55 percent in constant
dollars.
Navy budgets, including the Marine Corps, have been
roughly one third of total DOD spending for several decades.
The increase in Navy funding during the Reagan buildup was
slower, and peaked later in 1988. As shown in Figure 4,
during the Carter--Reagan era of buildup, 1979--1989, Navy
budget authority rose 148 percent and outlays rose 141
percent.
17
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Figure 3. Reagan Buildup -- Actual DOD Spending
(Source: Budget of the United States, FY 1980 to 1990.)
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Figure 4. Reagan Buildup -- Actual Navy Spending
(Source: Budget of the United States, FY 1-80 to 1990.)
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The buildup was, contrary to public conception, not as
dramatic in the number of uniformed personnel serving on
active duty, though the reserves increased roughly one
third. From 1979 to 1987, the total uniformed active duty
strength increased only 7.3 percent, to a peak of 2.2
million. Navy manning rose until 1988, a net increase of
14.7 percent, to the peak of 593,000. (Figure 5) Critics of
the buildup point to this as evidence that the Reagan money
was wasted. Alternatively, the increased expenditures were
not intended to increase the size of the military forces,
but rather their quality. The all volunteer force begun in
the 1970's had never been fully funded. The real change in
Navy personnel was in the quality of recruits, as required
for the increased sophistication of its technology.
A cornerstone of the Reagan buildup was to be a 600-ship
Navy. While the number of war ships never reached the 600
goal, nor even that of prior buildups, less capable ships
were replaced or upgraded with state of the art electronic
technology and weapons. (Figure 6) The apparent
disconnection in increases between dollars and forces is
partially explained by the creeping unit cost of modern
weapons. Cross-period material measures are complicated by
an exchange of quantity for quality. Adelman and Augustine
discuss the phenomena of rising unit procurement cost and
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Figure 5. Reagan Buildup -- Manning
(Source: Budget of the United States, FY 1980 to 1990.)
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Figure 6. Reagan Buildup -- Warships
(Source: Jane's Fighting Ships, 1979-1989.)
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G. SCORING THE DEMOBILIZATIONS
Military forces consist of people, material and
organization, and all three require funding. The
traditional analytical measurements for defense spending are
as a percentage of gross national product (Figure 7), and as
a percentage of total federal expenditures (Figure 8). From
either, the cycles of military funding are clearly visible.
The magnitude of each period's peak aligns with the scale of
the combat--more for World War II, less for Korea, still
less for Vietnam. Decreasing intensity and longer duration
support arguments that massive world-wide conflicts of the
past are anachronistic and that regional conflicts,
occurring regularly but checked by the super powers, have
reduced the severity of the cyclic oscillations.
Some defense analysts criticize these percentage
measures. Wirl prefers inflation-adjusted spending
measures. (Wirl, lecture, 1992) (Figure 9) He believes that
proponents of defense spending claimed unreal reductions in
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Figure 7. Defense IxpendituzeE as % of GNP
(Source: The Budcýt for Fiscal Year 1994 -- Supplement.)
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mi itary spending













Figure 8. Defense Expenditures as % of Federal Budget














Figure 9. Defense Spending, Constant 1982 $
(Source: The Budget for Fiscal Year 1994 -- Supplement.)
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Adelman and Augustine believe comparisons of defense
expenditures as a percentage of federal outlays from earlier
periods with current budgets are misleading because the
portion of the federal budget allotted to transfer payments
has ballooned (Adelman, 1990, pp. 81-85, 107-107). (Figure
10)
human resources and interest







Figure 10. Social Spending Budget Growth
(Source: The Budget for Fiscal Year 1994
Supplement.)
These expenditures form an entirely different sort of
government outlay than other discretionary domestic
accounts.
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A different picture of the cyclical fluctuations emerges
when transfers are subtracted from total expenditures, and
defense is calculated as a percentage against only
discretionary spending. (Figure 11)
military spending










Figure 11. Defense Spending without Human resources
& Interest
The cycle is visible in personnel levels, though less
dramatic. (Figure 12) Navy personnel levels follow the
familiar pattern. (Figure 13)
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DOD active duty
source: U. S. Stat.lstlcal Abstract
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Figure 22. DOD Acti4ve Duty Person~nel
(Source: U.S. Statistical Abstract.)
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Figure 13. USN Active Duty Personzel
(Source: Budgets of the United States, FY 1950 to 1994.
1940 and 1945 Year Figures From Jane's Fighting Ships.)
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Contribution of the nation's labor force to defense has
been in a steady decline, with less degree of "bump" during
the pcst-conflict periods. (Figure 14) Even the actual
conflicts required less of the nation's wealth as counted in
its young men.
In World War II, one man in ten was drafted to serve;
the Vietnam-era draft.. .brought one in 20 eligible males
in to the military. Today, roughly one in 42 Americans
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Figure 14. DOD Personnel an % of Labor Force.
(Source: Statistical Abstract of the United
States.)
When military service is viewed as a cost (man-per-defense
unit), defense productivity is increasing. If military
service is .-_onsidered a contribution and benefit to society,
this decline is a negative.
As a measure of force level the number of naval
warships, specifically combatants, is conveniently simple.
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(Figure 15) The Navy more than the other services is
hardware intensive, and ships have historically been a
measure of national power. Ships construction is slow and
funding reversals do not immediately appear in the number of
ships available. Cross-period comparisons are limited
because this simple measure ignores the technological
improvements in ships. However, as the nation's power
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Figure 15. USN Combatants in Service; Cold War
Average of 400.
(Source: Polmar, Naval Institute Guide to the
Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet, 1993.)
Overview illustrations reveal the cycles of mobilization and
demobilization, but viewing them collectively hinders
understanding of the separate periods. Chapter III begins a
more detailed review with the current drawdown.
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III. POST-COLD WAR
This chapter examines the demise of the Reagan-era
military establishment, covering the period 1985 to the
present. The Reagan peak in defense spending and force
levels is pegged, and the reductions since the peak are
outlined, including those that are projected or likely based
on statements by defense and administration officials. A
chronological approach is employed, reviewing each year with
regards to the Presidential budget requests and forecasts,
the resulting debates over defense budgets and policies,
significant events which impacted the budgets, and the
resultant budget authorizations and outlays. Greater detail
is given to the last four budgets, FY1991 through FY1994.
Their five year defense projections chronicle the continuing
revision in the direction of the national military
establishment towards successively lower levels. The
chapter ends with a scorecard report for the drawdown, in
funding, personnel and ships.
A. BEGINNINGS
The end of the Cold War was not marked by a single
event, as with the treaties closing periods of actual
combat. Beginning around 1985, the public discourse began
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to include the possibility, if not likelihood, of reduction
of the military forces. That year Gallup reported that 46
percent of the public felt there was "too much" military
spending, versus 36 percent believing the amount "just
right." (Gallup, 1991, p. 99) Defense proponents and
critics argued about "cuts", each using familiar polemical
tricks to sustain their objectives.
The claims that conservatives made that overall
defense spending was already declining and that the
buildup had ended in 1985 were fatuous. In the five
years from 1981 through 1985, defense outlays
totaled about $1.346 trillion in 1990 dollars...
from 1986 through 1990, the total was about $1.553
trillion, amounting to more than a 15 percent
increase. The buildup continued. (Wirl, 1992, p.
207)
After 1985, Congress began to effectively resist the
buildup. The factors in their success included perceptions
of waste in procurement, increased negotiations with the
Soviets, and the "Irangate" affair. These factors can be
grouped under two reduction drivers. The first group,
strategic, stems from a perception of reduced threat. It
began with the peristroika movement initiated by Gorbachev
in the Soviet Union, accelerated with the crumbling of the
Berlin Wall, was demonstrated by the successful
international coalition during Desert Storm, and culminated
with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The second was
economic, and has roots in the growing concern about the
increasing federal budgetary deficits. These were
accentuated during the 1991 recession and 1992 presidential
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election campaign, and they are still fermenting among the
new administration's debates about budget priorities.
Regardless, by the sunmner of 1993 the post-Cold War
demobilization is well engaged. For this analysis the
post-cold war reduction will be separated into two periods,
divided at the change of Presidents and parties with the
1992 election. This division is arbitrary, but convenient.
The periods will be referred to as Base Force I and Base
Force II.
B. 1987: FY1988 BUDGET
The President, as Commander-in-Chief, is expected to set
the direction for national security strategy, and usually
his annual budgets provide a platform for enunciating his
vision of threats and the forces needed to meet them.
Reagan used the annual budget documents to formally re-state
his defense program goals. Compared to previous budget
documents, 1950 to 1980, the discussions in his were
relatively lengthy, and always defense was prominently
placed among the national priorities. With his FY1988
submission, President Reagan complained about the
congressionally mandated slowdown of his defense program
which, though extremely small and a decrease only in real
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dollar terms, could be measured in both funding and
personnel levels. 2
Defense budget authority levels declined in real terms
in both 1986 and 1987. The 1987 appropriated amount is
now 6% below that for 1985. In those years, Congress
cut $65 billion from administration requests in both
operations and investment programs. (Budget, FY1988,
Part 1, p. 6)
[Congress budgets required]...a cut of 17,000 in
active duty military strength from levels requested in
1986 and 1987 (Budget, FYi988, Part 2 p. 2-7).
The only real decline would be overall DOD active duty
personnel, from 2,174,250 down to 2,172,400 in 1988. Though
less than one percent of the total uniformed service, this
cut was an important symbolic change in direction. Reagan
called again for real increases of three percent in defense
funding. This would continue the climb towards the
cherished 600-ship Navy goal, from 560 in 1988, to 582 by
1989 and 600 by 1990.
C. 1988: FY1989 BUDGET
In his final budget message, Reagan reviewed the recent
history of defense budgets and defended his military program
as a correction to the hollow forces of the seventies.
In the aftermath of Vietnam, defense expenditures
dropped sharply until 1978. Real outlays were $62
billion lower in 1980 than 1970, a 27 percent decrease.
(Budget, FY1989, p. 1-7)
2 References to budgets are by fiscal years, normally published
in the prior calendar year.
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He was proud of his defense increases, 52 percent in real
terms, from 1980 through 1987 (Budget, FY1989, p. 2a-4).
The transition from Reagan to Bush was not expected to bring
a radical change of direction, as defense had not been a
major campaign issue in the 1988 campaign (Wirl, 1992, p.
211).
While the administration maintained to Congress and the
press that the buildup would continue, there was one sign of
discord within the administration. On February 22, the
Secretary of the xavy, James Webb, resigned over what he
considered an abandonment of the conmmitment to the 600 ship
Navy.
The force structure of the Navy must not be allowed to
deteriorate. ... .defense reductions.. .have been made in
the wrong areas, and without clear strategic thought.
(Webb, 1988)
D. 1989: FY1990 BUDGET
The world events that would shape Base Force I began
slowly in 1989 with the beginning of the Bush
administration. Academia, the media, and Congress
acknowledged the diminishing threats to national security,
but President Bush's budget only hesitantly endorsed change,
reducing the increase called for by his predecessor to two
percent real growth through 1991. His budget message was
defensive in tone.
Defense budget authority declined for the fourth
straight year (Budget, FY1990, p. 1-7).
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National security objectives remain unchanged... the
rebuilding of national security capabilities will
proceed at a slower pace.... (Budget, FY1990, p. 2-5).
Traditional "doves* began proposing cuts which would not
have been taken seriously in any prior period. Often quoted
was a William Kaufman paper published by Brookings, which
suggested halving U.S. defense budgets within ten years.
(Mann, 1989, p. 17-20) Many of these sources had been
opponents of the Reagan buildup and were merely renewing
long-standing ideas for reductions. Yet, by the end of the
year there were reports of DOD planning figures below $200
billion (Morrocco, Dec 4, 1989).
Z. 1990: FY1991 BUDGET
The 1991 budget was the first one that was totally
President Bush's; it was notable for a symbolic change in
style, if not a dramatic change in direction. The
President's entire budget message was now only one page in
length, where Reagan's had been forty. National Defense
received only two lines in Bush's personal statement and
they were hidden under the heading of "Investing", along
with the drug programs. Defense moved down in the table of
contents from its traditional first or second listing to
ninth place. The first real discussion of defense occurred
on page 151 of the budget document. There were references
to the Berlin Wall, and acknowledgements of the democratic
forces in eastern Europe and progress with Soviet arms
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negotiations. Still, this budget included a somewhat
defiant refrain.
The national security objectives of the United States
remain unchanged (Budget, FY1991, p. 154).
The low-key presentation belied the actual support for
defense programs which would increase 1.3 percent in nominal
terms, but decline 2.6 percent in real terms. (Figure 16)
TABLE 3. FY1991 DOD BUDGET PROJECTION, NOMINAL $
FY BA % chg Outlay % chg
1989 $290.8 B actual $294.9 B actual
1990 $291.4 B 0.2% $286.8 B -2.7%
1991 $295.1 B 1.3% $292.1 B 1.8%
1992 $300.0 B 1.7% $296.9 B 1.6%
1993 $304.4 B 1.5% $299.0 B 0.7%
1994 $308.0 B 1.2% $302.3 B 1.1%
1995 $311.8 B 1.2% $304.8 B 0.8%
net 7.0% 1 3.4%
(Source: Budget of the United States, FY1991.)
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Figure 16. FY1991 5 Year Defense Plan
(Source: Budget of the United States, FY1991.)
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Some analysts expected the coming reductions would
impact the Navy less than the other branches, in light of
its traditional role in gunboat diplomacy (Tritten, 1991,
p.116). However, these small funding changes caused
significant impacts on capital intensive naval forces. The
budget admitted the number of ships would decline,
officially abandoning the cherished Reagan goal of a
600-ship fleet. Navy manning would also fall, though
slightly, as would the ratio between the two.
TABLE 4. FY1991 NAVAL FORCES PROJECTION
year ships V chg personnel * chg ratio
1989 566 actual 593,000 actual 954
1990 551 -2.7% 591,000 -0.3% 932
1991 546 -0.9% 585,000 -1.0% 933
net -3.6% -1.4% -2.2%
(Source: Budget of the United States, FY1991.)
These budget "cuts" in real dollar terms did not satisfy
administration critics who called for a new military
strategy to justify proposed force levels. Lacking
sufficient specifics from the Department of Defense, the
Congress began to assert leadership (Stockton, 1991, p. 82).
Congress directed the Pentagon to provide a response to
three possible budget scenarios of $280, $250 or even $200
billion dollars (Gilmartin, 1990, p. 27)). Half of the
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public now felt that there was too much spending on the
military (Gallup, 1991, p. 69).
One of the most effective criticisms of the defense
budget came from Senator Nunn, who attributed Bush's
gestures at cutting defense to fiscal rather than strategic
motivations (Wirl, 1992, p. 218). On March 22, 1990, he
gave a speech on the Senate floor outlining what he termed
the "blanks" being fired by the administration, and
disconnections between what circumstances called for and
what President Bush was offering. These "blanks" included
threats, strategy, dollars, force structure and
programming--in effect, the entire national security
program. Several of Nunn's points would later resurface as
major blocks to more rapid cutting, including the lag in
savings between authorizations and outlays, and the pain of
personnel demobilizations. He noted with concern that some
of the budget cuts were vague rather than programmatically
identified.
$39 billion of the accumulated savings occurring over
the next five years come from proposals in the Defense
Management Report, and the definitive path to these
savings has not yet been revealed. (Nunn, 1990, p. 2967)
On August 2, 1990, President Bush gave a speech in
Aspen, Colorado and began to define a "new world order."
The speech was the result of a "top-down" national security
review, conducted by only a few people, and without input by
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the military chiefs. 3 The comprehensive abottom-up reviewn
to follow would have to wait for 1993 and then-Secretary of
Defense Aspin.
F. 1991: FY1992 BUDGIT
The FY 1992 Bush budget message was similarly short on
discussion. Defense moved down in the table of contents to
eleventh place. In the last paragraph of the President's
personal message appeared an almost apologetic statement of
defense policy.
Finally, consistent with the statutory caps enacted
last year, the budget provides the resources necessary
to maintain national security.... (Budget, FY1992, p. 4).
Substantive discussion of the defense budget was pushed back
to page 183. There, the administration made a brief
acknowledgement of what was widely accepted elsewhere.
The reduced threat of a major war with the Soviet
Union presents the opportunity to reduce and restructure
military forces (Budget, FY1992, p. 183).
As refinement of the vision introduced in the President's
Aspen speech, this was too tepid for defense cutters and too
timid for spenders. The budget five year forecast for
defense was cut again, a net three percent in real terms,
but there was no evidence of major "reducing and
restructuring." (Figure 17)
3 (See Tritten, 1991.)
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TABLZ 5. FY1992 DOD BUDGET PROJ-CTION. NOMINAL $
year BA % chg Outlay % chg
1990 $291.8 B actual $289.1 B actual
1991 $272.6 B -6.6% $287.1 B -0.7%
1992 $279.0 B 2.3% $283.5 B -1.3t
1993 $278.6 B -0.1% $279.8 B -1.3%
1994 $279.0 B 0.1t $274.0 B -2.1%
1995 $281.5 B 0.9% $275.4 B 0.5%
1996 $283.4 B 0.7% $279.3 B 1.4%
net -2.7% -3.4%
(Source: Budget of the United States, FY1992.)
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Figure 17. FY1992 5 Year Defense Plan
(Source: Budget of the United States, FY1992.)
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The projected budget cuts in ships and naval manning
were continued, increased, and were proportionally greater
than overall DOD budget cuts.
TABLI 6. FY1992 DON FORCE PROJECTIONS
year ships I chg personnel % chg ratio
1990 545 actual 583,000 actual 935
1991 528 -3.2% 570,000 -2.3% 926
1992 477 -10.7% 551,000 -3.4% 866
1993 464 -2.8% 536,000 -2.8% 866
net -13.9% -5.7%
(Source: Budget of the United States, FY1992.)
Military planners may have been ahead of the
administration. JCS staff had been working on the base
force before the attempted coup in the Soviet Union,
estiixting an eventual decline to 4.7 percent of GDP, and
19.6 percent of federal expenditures, the lowest since 1940.
These plans continued during Desert Storm. (Farmer, 1992)
Unlike the President's budget message, the official
National Military Strategy (NMS) document written that year
would clearly state the new circumstances, declaring the end
of the Cold War. The NMS, published in January, 1992,
portrayed the "Base Force" with comparisons to then current
force levels. There was now a strategic foundation being
advanced for reduced military forces.
This military strategy, which places a premium in
efficiency without compromising effectiveness, is
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designed to be implemented within a significantly
reduced defense budget. (NMS, 1992, p. 4)
BASE FORCE COMPOSITION
STRATEGIC FY 91 BASE FORCE




Active 16 Divisions 12 Divisions
Reberve 10 Divisions 6 Divisions




Active 13 Air Wings 11 Air Winos
Reserve 2 Air Wings 2 Air Wings
USMC
Active 3 MEFs 3 MEFs
Reserve 1 Div./Wing 1 Div./Wing
AIR FORCE
Active 22 FWE 15 FWE
Reserve 12 FWE 11 FWE
(Source: National Military strategy of the United States, 1992)
Curiously, the NMS forecast a lower number of ships than the
President's FY 1992 budget (450 versus 477). This may signify
the rapidity of revisions during this period.
It was questionable whether defense budgets were going to be
able to support even those reduced force levels. Congressional
Budget Office projections found resources to support only 310
ships, not the 450 ships called for in the Base Force. (Stockton,
1991, p.105) This was the scale being suggested by Ullman, but
dismissed by most, and would prove to be very close to the next
administration's plans in 1993.
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DOD officials touted the Base Force in Congressional
testimony, and included lists of effected reductions in their
public conmments. Typical were the remarks of Deputy Defense
Secretary Atwood that April.
The Army has cut four divisions... the Navy is
going down to 450 ships.. .the Air Force has already cut
1,000 aircraft; fewer remain in the active inventory than
in 1950.... (Atwood, 1992).
Secretary Cheny repeatedly mentioned the relaxation of nuclear
alert forces as evidence of the administration's movement. He
and Chairman Powell were forceful advocates for continued defense
spending before congressional committees, speaking for an
"increasing role" and "modernizing", rather than reducing. They
employed contrasts to domestic spending increases and constantly
repeated the planned "twenty-five percent" reduction by 1995.
This percentage appeared to apply to personnel levels (down to
1.6 million, from 2.2 million) and approximately to funding in
inflation-adjusted dollar terms. If applied to ships it would
have required the lower level of 300.
A ubiquitous factor in DOD briefings was the so-called
"pitch fork chart," which dramatically depicted the revision of
defense budgets. (Figure 18) Using real dollar presentations,
the chart showed four subsequent budget forecasts, each declining
more. By its choice of dependent variable and scale (budget
authority, $210 to $350 billion dollars), the chart called
attention to "30 percent" cuts. An alternative depiction, with a
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full scale, makes those same cuts seem less severe, though the
direction was the same: down. (Figure 19)
The apparently easy victory in the Gulf War, and rapid
resolution of the August 1991 brief coup attempt against
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Figure 18. Cheny "Pitchfork" Chart
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Figure 19. Alternative Pitchfork Chart
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G. 1992: 7Y1993 BUDGET
President Bush's final statement on the future of national
defense appeared in his FY1993 budget. The symbolic decline in
the importance of defense in budgetary priorities was marked by
its later appearance in the document. There were references to
the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and the collapse of the
Soviet Union. Under political pressure, his State-of-the-Union
address called for an additional $50 billion in defense cuts, but
did not specify the programs. The five year forecast was reduced
modestly for the third consecutive year. (see Figure 20)
TABLE 7. 7Y1993 DOD BUDGET PROJECTION, NOKINAL $
year BA %chg Outlay %chg
1992 $277.5 B actual $283.1 B actual
1993 $267.6 B -3.6% $272.8 B -3.6%
1994 $267.8 B 0.1% $267.4 B -2.0%
1995 $269.9 B 0.8% $267.9 B 0.2%
1996 $270.4 B 0.2% $270.9 B 1.1%
1997 $274.6 B 1.6% $273.6 B 1.0%
net -1.0% -3.3%
(Source: Budget of the United States, FY1993.)
There were more protests from advocates of demobilization.
Senator Mitchell asked for $100 billion in defense program cuts.
Senators Kennedy, Metzenbaum and Sasser were speaking publicly of
even $200 billion cuts. Congressman Dellums wanted $50 billion
cut from the next fiscal year. (Towell, Feb 2, 1992)
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Figure 20. FY1993 5 Year Defense Plan
(Source: Budget of the United States, FY1993.)
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As predicted by Senator Nunn two years earlier, the calls
for severe cuts in defense budgets began to dissipate once
lawmakers were faced with making budget marks, and the pains of
demobilization became visible. In March, 1992, Senator Nunn laid
out the impacts of cutting defense for Congress to consider.
In order to make the reductions in defense already
included in the President's FY1993 budget, by 1996 one
million jobs will be lost in the Defense Department, and an
additional one million jobs in the defense industry. (Nunn,
March 1992)
The pain associated with force structure reductions has caused
lawmakers turn to symbolic cuts, such as voting to kill the
selective service system and ban nuclear testing. Adding to the
frustration of perennial defense cutters was that the defense
slice of the budget pie had shrunk to only a fifth of total
expenditures. Faced with difficulty in cutting overall force
levels, lawmakers turned to expenditures on specific programs
considered wasteful, including the Strategic Defense Initiative,
and the B-2 bomber.
The military establishment's word-of-the-day was efficiency.
On September 28, 1992, some four years into the post-cold war
reduction, the Navy issued a new strategy document. The document
codified "the new direction" of the Navy and Marine Corps, but
came too late to affect the budgetary battles. Fiscal realities
would shape the future force.
The 1992 election provided little debate over defense
policy, but each candidate tried to outbid the others on defense
budget cuts. The candidate with the highest bid won.
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Bush -- 50 billion
Clinton -- 100 more than Bush by 1997
Harkin -- 50 percent, or $140 billion over ten years
Kerry -- 30 percent over ten years
Tsongas -- 30 percent over five years
(Source: Congressional Research Weekly Report, Feb 1, 1992)
H. 1993: FY1994 BUDGZT
Base Force II took stage with the election of President
Clinton and appointment of former Congressman Les Aspin as
Secretary of Defense. As House Armed Services Committee chairman
Aspin played a leading role in the budgetary debates over Base
Force I. Now, he and President Clinton will shape the second
phase of reduction of military forces. While it is too soon to
see the final results, trend lines are estimable. (Figure 21)
Aspin began a nearly constant stream of statements and
signals on defense cuts. He repeated the President's campaign
pledge to make additional, but moderate cuts from the Bush
defense program -- now $60 billion over five years (Towell, Jan
1, 1993, pp. 80-86). Some of the administration's early moves
have been confusing. Aspin announced a "bottom-up" review of
defense requirements. Within a month, he ordered the services to
identify $10.8 billion in immediate cuts. An end point was
pegged at a 1.6 million troop level for 1996, 200,000 below the
Bush plan (Towell, Fpb f, 1993, p. 275). The Navy was clearly
marked for reduction; ships were now to drop from 443 to 412
(Towell, Mar 20, 1993, p. 678), and to 320 by 1997 ("Aspin Budget
Bomb," Navy Times, Feb 15, 1993, p. 12).
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President Clinton's FY 1994 budget message included no
discussion of national security or military spending. Continuing
the Bush trend for symbolic positioning, defense numbers were
pushed down to the 35th position in the table of contents, and
discussion was back to page 441. Funding, troop levels and
weapons, were all cut more than discussed during the campaign.
Yet some still complained about a *salami slice" approach to
reduction, rather than identifying individual programs for
elimination ("Aspin's FY94 Budget Lacks Bite," Armed Forces
Journal, May, 1993, pp. 17-18, 21-22).
TABLE 8. FY1994 DOD BUDGET PROJECTIONS, NOMINAL $
year BA & chq outlay t chq
1992 $282.1 B actual $286.9 B actual
1993 $258.9 B -8.2% $277.2 B -3.4%
1994 $250.7 B -3.1% $264.2 B -4.7%
1995 $248.1 B -1 .1% $258.0 B -2.3%
1996 $240.3 B -3.1% $251.6 B -2.5%
1997 $232.8 B -3.1% $233.7 B -7.1%
1998 $240.5 B 3.3% $239.2 B 2.4%
net-1.%-.7
(Source: Budget of the United States, FY1994.)
The budget reduced personnel levels another 108,000, and
returned defense spending to 1983 levels, but in inflated
dollars. Chairman Dellums ultimately supported the defense
budget, the only one in 22 years in Congress. ("Dellums Vote for
Defense a Change Form the Past,", Dow Jones, August 2, 1993)
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Figure 21. FY1994 5 Year Defense Plan
(Source: Budget of the United States, FY1994.)
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Closer examination of the cutting by funding accounts may
suggest where the new administration plans to make additional
cuts in future budgets: personnel and acquisition accounts. If
an accurate precursor, these could suggest an intention to
consume the military infrastructure. Alternatively, they may
reflect a desire to attain immediate savings from fast spending
accounts, or keep funds flowing to specific constituents.
TABLE 9. FY1994 BUDGET DON ACCOUNTS (BILLIONS)
ACCOUNT FY93 FY94 %CHG
personnel $76.3 $70.1 -9.2%
O&M $86.4 $89.5 1.2%
acquisition $53.6 $45.5 -17.0%
R&D $38.2 $38.6 -1.1%
MILCON $4.5 $5.8 25.6%
housing $3.9 $3.8 -6.9%
TOTAL $259.1 $250.7 -5.0%
(Source: Budget of the United States, FY1994.)
On May 30, 1993, Secretary Aspin unveiled a new defense
strategy, termed "Win-Hold-Win". The U.S. would no longer plan
to fight on two fronts simultaneously. Instead, a holding action
would suffice for one front, until the other was secured.
Critics saw this as another case of finding strategy to fit
programming, and administration spokesmen admitted the new
strategy would cut additional aircraft carriers and allow big
cuts in military spending (Gordon, 1993, p. 16A). Revision of
threat assessment is not a new budgetary maneuver. When faced
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with fiscal problems, President Nixon cut defense and announced a
shift from preparation for "a two and one-half war to a one and
one-half war, capability (Ravenal, 1984, p.20).
The new strategy was quickly followed by an additional $5.5
billion cut from FY1994's operating budget. (Dow Jones, Jun 9,
1993) These were made before completion of the bottom-up review
intended to identify force requirements, and even though the
previous cuts '...already made are enough." ("Aspin Seeking
Deeper Budget Cuts," Dow Jones, June 10, 1993) The Navy absorbed
32.7t of that cut. An example of its impact is a required cut in
active duty officers of 4,700, or 7.5 percent, in FY1994. Navy
spokesman no longer talk about maximizing effectiveness, only
efficiency.
The Navy's strategy in the downsizing environment is
to maintain only the minimum level of organic capability
(Ricks, 1993).
This strategy would prove to be in-line with the Secretary's
evolving ideas of the reduced importance of naval forces.
During the Cold War, when we talked about a naval
presence overseas, we thought of a carrier group.... In
the post-Cold War era, new approaches will be necessary...
detailing how other services would be able to meet U.S.
strategic requirements around the world ("Aspin Considers Cut
of Navy Carriers," Dow Jones, June 24, 1993).
A review of the headlines for the year's Navy Times tells
the story succinctly:
"Echoes of 1946: What Now?' (Jan. 4)
"Aspin's Budget Bomb." (Feb. 15)
"Thinking Small." (Feb. 15)
"Senate Endorses $172 Billion Defense Cut." (Apr. 5)
"New DEPSECDEF Says ,oing to pre-WW2 Levels." (May 17)
"Carrier Fleet of 12 Seems Sunk." (Jun. 28)
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Indirect impacts of these reductions are being felt, and
Secretary Aspin has admitted that recruit quality among the
services is already slipping. ("Aspin Fears Military Quality
Slipping," Dow Jones, June 2, 1993) Even the all volunteer
force, which most military professionals consider to lie at the
core of the military successes of the 1980's and 1990's has come
under renewed scrutiny. David Wood and others have raised
serious questions about the social alienation of a "mercenary"
force, where fewer serve and serve longer (Wood, June 27, 1993).
Fiscal year 1993 will end on an ominous note for the military.
I. SCORING THE POST-COLD WAR REDUCTION
Together Base Force I and II provide a ten year period of
reduction for examination. The depth of the budgetary reductions
is highlighted by updates on Secretary Cheny's pitchfork chart.
(Figures 22 & 23) Each subsequent budget from 1988 to 1994
lowered projections of future defense funding and forces.
For example, examining forecast authority for 1995 from the
FY1991 to FY1994 budgets finds subsequent reductions of 9.7, 4.1,
and 8.1 percent from the FY1991 actual. The cumulative effect of
these revisions is a net reduction in the FY1995 deferse budget
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Figure 22. Subsequent Defense Budget 5 year Plans; BA
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Figure 23. Subsequent Defense Budget 5 year Plans; Outlays
(Source: Budget of the United States, FY 1991--1994.)
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Projected manning levels show similar degree of reductions,
revised continually lower. (Figure 24) From the 1988 peak of
over two million in uniform to the 1994 target of 1.6 million
constitutes the commonly reported 25 percent demobilization.
While the FY94 budget only covers through 1994 for manning
projections, the Clinton administration is speaking of 1.4
million uniformed personnel by 1997, equaling the demobilization
goal set after World War II. These levels will leave the
uniformed military at approximately one half of one percent of
the nation's population.
TABLE 10. DOD BUDGET MANNING PROJECTIONS (X 1000)
budqet: FY91 FY92 FY93 FY94
1990 2076
1991 2039 1974 2003
1992 1886 1865 1808
1993 1795 1767 1728
1994 1621
(Note: first entry of each fiscal year an actual.)
(Source: Budget of the United States, FY 1991--1994.)
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Figure 24. DOD Manning Projections
(Source: Budget of the United States, FY 1991--1994.)
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Navy officials are projecting taking the force down to
400,000 active duty personnel by that year, the lowest level
since prior to World War II. (Figure 25)
TABLE 11. USN MANNING BUDGET PROJECTIONS (X 1000)
budget: FY91 FY92 FY93 FY94
1990 591
1991 585 570 571
1992 551 551 542
1993 536 536 526
194i-
(Note: first entry in each fiscal year is actual.)
(Source: Budget of the United States, FY 1991-1994.)
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Figure 25. USN Manning Projections
(Source: Budget of the United States, FY 1991-1994.)
66
J. SUMMARY
The latest end point for ships is in the 320 range (Witter,
1993, p. 2) Taking budget forecasts for manning levels and
funding, and assuming a consistent percentage of funding for the
Navy, it is possible to project a total picture of the post-Cold
War reduction.
TABLE 12. POST-COLD WAR SCORECARD
peak ...... trough ...... .. chg rate
DOD $ 1989 $312B 1997 $164B -47.5% -5.9%
USN $ 1989 $97B 1997 $42B -56.2% -7.0%
DOD man. 1987 2174K 1997 1400K -35.6% -3.6%
USN man. 1988 593K 1997 400K -32.5% -3.6%
ships 1985 570 1997 320 -40.4% -3.4%
(Note: Budget outlays in consant 1987 dollars.)
These projections indicate that funding is being cut
relatively more than people and material. (Figure 26) Either
they will operate without normal support services and
maintenance, or operations will shrink to save wear and tear. We
may be headed for another hollow force, relatively larger in
people than ships, and ships than dollars. By every measure
discussed--nominal dollars, real dollars, percentages of GNP and
total federal spending, personnel and ships--we are headed for a
Navy which will be smaller than at any time since 1939. The
following chapters will examine previous post-conflict drawdowns
and compare them to this period. They suggest some reasons why
the previous reductions began and were ended.
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Figuze 26. Post-Cold War Navy
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IV. POST-WORLD WAR II
This chapter examines the demobilization of America's
victorious armed forces after World War II, during the period
1946 through 1950, and recounts the decisions and viewpoints of
the principals involved with the post-war demobilization. It
demonstrates that this period offers less for direct comparison
to later periods because the war's mobilization peak was uniquely
high. An argument is made that inclusion of this period can
actually distort the analysis. However, it concludes that there
was a similar refrain amonj the period's debate over what floor"
should be maintained in defense budgets and force levels.
Additionally, two comparisons are noted to later periods. One
similarity deals with the revision in the post-conflict
administration's perspective, and their struggle with
congressional prerogatives as seen later in the post-Vietnam and
Cold War periods. A second comparison lies in the role specific
world events played in stated national security strategy, and the
budgets and forces that were maintained to pursue that strategy.
A chronology is provided for the fiscal year budgets and force
level adjustments. Finally, the period is found to be useful in
completing the picture of how and why demobilizations begin,
develop and end. The chapter ends with the scorecard for the
reduction.
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A. 1945: WORLD WAR II PEAK
The scale of endeavor in World War II, both military and
civilian at home, dwarfed all other events in modern history.
The 1945 defense budget took 90 percent of the national spending
and 40 percent of GNP. Because of the war spending, the national
debt more than quadrupled in four years, and it exceeded GNP for
the only time. Almost thirty percent of the labor force was in
uniform. The mobilization was so substantial and the victory so
complete, that the post-war period almost had to become a
waterfall of demobilization. For these reasons, the post-war
period offers less opportunity for direct comparison to the later
drawdowns in the rate or degree of reduction. More pertinent is
the "floor" towards which the drawdown headed, and the rate at
which it was approached. Evidence suggests original plans would
have reduced the military to pre-war levels below one percent
mobilization. Concerns over European instability halted
reduction after two years,and defense budgets oscillated while
national security requirements were debated. Before real
consensus was achieved, Korea ended the drawdown.
a. 1946
The use of the atomic bomb against Japan brought the war to
an unexpectedly rapid close. Millions of troops were left
overseas and the impetus was to get them home, mustered out and
back to work in civilian jobs.
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Troops abroad began to demand discharges. Some of them
remembered the Depression years and the large-scale
unemployment and wanted to get out of uniform and back into
civilian jobs before such jobs vanished (Pogue, 1987, p.
157).
Congress ordered the services to get moving on demobilization.
Marshall, responsible for order in occupied areas, warned of
demobilizing too quickly. War Department statements against
rapid demobilization were followed by demonstrations and near
riots by some troops.
Military leaders, so recently adulated for victory, were
attacked for wanting to keep large forces under arms in
order to retain large budgets (Pogue, 1987, pp. 157-8).
Demobilization outran any prior planning. Marshall had
tried to setup a planning group in 1943, but the rapidity of the
war's end caught them short. By the end of the fiscal year some
nine million men had been released from service, leaving the
services at only one quarter of the 1945 peak level. Those
released represented eight percent of the national labor force.
Similar scale reductions were planned for placing warships in
reserve, but were delayed by limited resources. All these
demobilization efforts were expensive, and the drop in 1946
defense expenditures lagged behind the personnel reduction,
though still falling an impressive 45 percent.
This situation was similar to, but more severe than that
which faced JCS Chairman Powell during 1992. Desert Storm
interrupted his demobilization and aggravated inherent problems
when it resumed after the conflict. Similar charges were made
about military foot-dragging on personnel reductions after Desert
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Storm. As in 1946, the Congress was pushing for demobilization
and the administration was resisting. The difference is that in
1946 conscripted service personnel sought release, where 1993
volunteers do not wish to leave a military career for an
uncertain job market, above seven percent unemployment.
C. 1947: PY1948 BUDGET
World economic prcblems dominated American national security
thinking immediately after the war. While the populace turned to
domestic activities, the administration was occupied with Europe.
As in 1990--1992, the race of European events in the late 1940's
made strategic plans obsolete. The perceived threat was, as now,
an unstable Europe. To meet it, the Marshall Plan substituted
foreign aid for direct military spending against the Soviets.
President Truman had to balance continuing requirements for
military occupation against demobilization desires. Like
President Bush in 1992, President Truman saw himself as holding
the line against an imprudent Congress, too anxious to encourage
the voters towards disengagement.
By the end of the fiscal year, the actual rate of decline in
defense budgets had increased over the prior year's, falling 70
percent in outlays. The remaining funding, equivalent to 90
billion dollars in constant 1987 dollars, was only one third the
1993 budget for a force of approximately the same size as that
projected for 1997. Service personnel on active duty were
reduced another 47 percent, leaving only one and a half million
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in uniform. This glide path would have led to pre-war readiness
levels if continued for one more year.
D. 1948: PY1949 DUDGUT
The FY1949 budget called for "the minimum forces" necessary
to sustain peace. World events soon reshaped President Truman's
judgement about "minimum" requirements, and he called for an end
to the post-war demobilization. The first move towards reversing
the reduction came on March 17, 1948, when addressing Congress,
the President recommended enactment of permanent universal
military training and temporary continuation of the selective
service program. These were followed by recommendations for
additional 20 percent increase in defense authorizations, to a
total of 14.7 billion dollars, but it was not provided.
Behind all defense debates of the fifties was the question
of whether atomic bombs could replace large, standing armies. A
vocal minority called for continued conventional forces
(Callahan, 1990, pp. 51-2). As the "menace" of the Soviet Union
grew, America hoped to avoid an arms race by funding European
recovery and relying on its atomic arsenal. There is a
similarity in today's aid to Russia and the former Soviet Union
satellites. Truman would have preferred conventional forces,
however, the estimated cost of sufficient conventional forces in
Europe was $45 billion (Callahan, 1990, p.63). That was too much
for Congress, which had established a ceiling at $13.5 billion.
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Unable to maintain large conventional forces, Truman decided
to proceed with development of the H-bomb. The wisdom of a
primary reliance on nuclear weapons was soon questioned by the
President, who grew concerned less his options for reaction to
Soviet blockades and the Berlin crisis be too limited.
Truman was even asking Congress to reinstate conscription,
a request granted in the Selective Service Act of June of
[1948] (Kennedy, 1987, p. 378).
Demobilization leveled out in 1948. That year would see the
lowest manning and funding levels for national defense, not only
for the post-World War II period, but since. DOD manning
dezreased another nine percent, to 1,446,000 at fiscal year end.
The defense outlays were only eleven percent of their war peak,
the equivalent of $55 billion constant 1987 dollars. The funding
cut seemed small in dollars relative to the previous three years,
but was actually another 29 percent.
1. 1949: FY1950 BUDGET
1949 was a seesaw year for defense readiness. The
administration was concerned that defense spending had reached,
and perhaps dipped below a safe condition. The President's
personal message characterized the FY1950 Budget as still driven
by security concerns, even though defense spending had fallen
dramatically since the war.
The 1950 Budget, like all those since the end of the war,
is dominated by our international and national defense
programs. Together, they are expected to amount to 21
billion dollars, or half the budget expenditures. (Budget,
FY1950, p. M7)
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The goal would be "adequate", rather than merely the prior
"minimum" national defense forces. While no specific threat was
identified in the budget message (Korea was not yet recognized),
Truman again asked the Congress to increase expenditures
substantially both in 1950 (from 11.8 to 14.3 billion dollars)
and 1951. The budget asked for 15.9 billion dollars in new
defense authorizations, and 4.6 billion dollars for the Navy. In
one of the most cogent expressions of strategic planning in any
budget message, President Truman wrote:
The military forces recommended in this Budget are the
most powerful ever maintained in peacetime. The principal
objective we should have in mind in planning for our
national defense at this time is to build a foundation of
military strength which can be sLitained for a period of
years without excessive strain on our productive resources,
and which will permit rapid expansion should the need arise.
(Budget, FY1950, p. M7)
This was an unequivocal refutation of his critics' complaint;
namely, that there would be no return to the pre-war manning and
spending levels. The phrase, "which can be sustained," suggested
that the government should decide on a permanent readiness level,
rather than expect to rapidly mobilize under crisis. In contrast
to President Reagan in the 1980's, Truman was willing and did
call for a tax increase to continue his programs, including
defense. Congress resisted both.
In March, 1949, the NSC undertook a major re-evaluation of
national security policy to address the issues of atomic and
conventional forces. It was a particularly important period for
the Navy.
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In the post-1945 retrenchment of defense expenditures, and
"rationalization" of the separate services into a unified
defense ministry.., navies came under heavy pressure.
(Kennedy, 1987, p. 386).
Truman spoke of "adjusting the composition" of the naval fleet,
and said he would maintain 731 ships and 288 combatants. Not all
strategic thinkers were convinced that the Navy was archaic.
Despite the advent of atomic weapons, Nitze argued,
traditional weapons of war such as.. .naval forces would
remain of paramount importance in the new age. [Atomic]
bombs.. .made the danger of another Pearl Harbor many times
greater. (Callahan, 1990, pp. 51-3)
Most of the decision makers did not agree, and ships were laid
up.
The biggest blcw suffered by the U.S. Navy during the year
[April 29] was the suspension of the giant fleet aircraft
carrier United States, 65,000 tons, only a few days after
her keel was laid (Jane's, 1950, pp. vi-vii).
The absolute end of the post-war drawdown was reactionary to
world events rather than the result of strategic planning. The
first of these watershed events occurred on September 3, 1949,
when atomic testing was detected in the USSR. There was a
temporary reversal of trends, but the FY1950 and FY1951 budgets
continued reduction, though more in rhetoric than fact. Personnel
levels fell again before surging for Korea. (Figure 27)
TABLE 13. ACTIVE DUTY STRENGTH (xl000) FLUCTUATIONS
Jun 47 Apr 48 Jun 48 Dec 48 Jun 49
1,583 1,394 1,446 1,604 1,615
- 1 1 = =1 ----
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Figure 27. DOD Manning Fluctuations, 1947-1950
(Source: Budget of the United States, FY 1950.)
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7. 1950: FY1951 BUDGZT
In the continuing oscillations of strategic thinking, and
despite the recently completed 1949 strategic review, Truman
ordered another complete review on January 31, 1950. It provided
new confirmation that his desire to move away from primary
reliance on nuclear weapons would require large defense budgets.
The politics of the year centered on economic recovery, and after
several years of having Congress trim his defense budgets, Truman
acceded to the Congressional will and submitted a budget within
the congressional cap, with 3.9 billion for the Navy.
The budget message forecast relatively stable defense
budgets for the near term. Truman recommended slight personnel
reductions, 2.6 percent overall and 6.3 percent for the Navy.
The active fleet would decrease to 652 ships, of which 238 were
combatants. There was obviously no anticipation of Korea.
The end of the fiscal year results left DOD manning at
1,460,000, almost 10 percent cut below 1949 and just above the
1947 all time low. Outlays would increase four percent. For
awhile it seemed that the wild fluctuations were gone and that
defense levels were stabilizing. A debate ensued within the
administration over defense budgets. Oddly, the State
Department, under Dean Acheson, Robert Lcvett and Paul Nitze,
took the lead in calling for substantial military spending while
Defense Secretary Johnson argued for cutting. The hardliners won
and Truman fired Johnson. They developed National Security
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Council document 68, arguing that the United States could out-
spend the Soviets. While Truman agreed with the premise, he did
not like its fiscal implications of $40 billion dollar defense
budgets and did not immediately sign it.
The second watershed event occurred on June 24, 1950, as
North Korea invaded South Korea. Truman secretly signed a
revised NSC 68/3 and publicly called for increasing military
personnel on active duty to 3.2 million. The post-World War II
drawdown was officially and completely ended.
G. SCORING THE POST-WORLD WAR II REDUCTION
The post-World War II demobilization was a rapid and
dramatically deep fall over a few years. (Figure 28) The
following years, 1947--1950, were calm relative to the 1945 and
1952 war year peaks, but in any other period they would be
considered severe budget fluctuations, dropping and rising by one
third to nearly one half. President Truman's call for sustained
defense funding had gone unheeded. Viewed together, Truman's
budget requests in 1948 and 1949 create an upward-curving,
reverse image of the 1992 Cheny "pitchfork" chart. (Figure 29)
Ironically, when he finally succumbed to the Congress and reduced
his defense requests for 1950, world events bore out the wisdom
of his original budgets. The 1948 budget submission for FY1949,
rejected by the Congress, would have taken defense spending on a
trend line which would have intersected the eventual level spent
at the start of Korea. Figure 30 illustrates the scoring.
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TABLE 14. POST-WWUE SCORECARD
peak... trough... V chg rate 1989-87
DOD $ 1945 $599B 1948 $58B -90V -30% -48%
USN $ 1944 $208B 1947 $22B -899 -30% -53%
DOD man. 1945 12123K 1948 1460K -88% -29% -36%
USN man. 1944 3228K 1947 444K -86% -29% -33%
41945 1950 238 -70% -14% -40%
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Figure 28. Post-WW2 Defense Spending
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Figure 29. Truman Defense Requests vs. Actuals
(Source: Historical Tables, Budget of the United States,
1990.)
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Figure 30. Pont-WW2 Navy
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a. SUMMARY
While the range of reduction in the post-World War II period
was unique, there were lessons for the later post-conflict
periods. First, despite an awareness by the administration of
the need for strategic planning, both their efforts and prior
efforts by military staffs were to no avail. Current events
drove the reduction, as political demands were for swift reaction
to each significant occurrence. Secondly, though decision makers
intended to retain a re-mobilization capability, the follow-on
crisis came too quickly and the nation was not sufficiently
prepared. Third, the president's grasp of the issue grew with
experience, but his political weakness left Congress in charge.
The post-war demobilization, too rapid and without the
guidance of a national security strategy, hurt during the early
days of the Korean War, when Marshall had inadequate resources.
Many became concerned that America never again be militarily
unprepared. Chapter V. discusses how these concerns played out
in the post-Korean drawdown, and how the nuclear--conventional
forces debate was decided.
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V. POST- KOREA
This chapter deals with the post-Korean War period, from
1953 through 1960. It argues that President Eisenhower was
unique in both his consistent determination to hold down defense
spending, and his success among modern presidents in
accomplishing both his defense and economic goals. A contrast is
drawn to the reversed roles of the President and Congress in the
current drawdown. Another contrast is the lessened impact of
world events on defense budgets. These aspects of the period can
be followed in the chronological treatment of the fiscal year
defense budgets. The chapter ends with the scorecard for the
reductions.
A. UNIQUE ROLE OF PRESIDENT EISENHOWER
Like the post-World War II period, the post-Korean War
drawdown was conducted by the same president who ended the war.
But unlike President Truman, President Eisenhower came to office
with great popularity, experience in foreign affairs, and stature
as a military leader equaled only by Washington and Grant. He
spent these political assets to hold down defense budgets in an
effort to foster prosperity. Like Reagan, he focused on the
economic prosperity and military strength. Unlike Reagan, he
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achieved them without deficits. The difference lay in his
success with Congress and reliance on nuclear weapons for
defense. As will be shown by the chronological review which
follows, President Eisenhower had to fight Congress and handle
international crises like other presidents to achieve his goals.
Both pressed him for increased defense budgets, but President
Eisenhower successfully resisted those efforts.
B. 1953:1 Y1954 BUDGET
President Truman's last budget was dominated by defense as
all had been since 1945. The defense budget authorizations that
peaked in 1952 resulted in still higher expenditures and
mobilization levels in 1953 and 1954. The armed forces had more
than doubled from 1950 to 1953, to 3.6 million personnel.
Already looking to a "post-Korean" period, the president
predicted level defense spending for the near term, and perhaps
$15 billion in gradual, outyear reductions (Budget, FY1954, p.
M10). Truman continued a "pay-as-you-go" attitude towards his
defense program, calling for extension of the excise tax (Budget,
FY1954, p. M7). Among the provisions within the defense budget
was funding for 408 warships.
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TABLE 15. FY1954 TRUMAN DEFENSE BUDGET PROJECTION
FY new BA % chg Outlay % ch_
1951 $ 48.2 B --- $ 19.7 B --- actual
1952 $ 60.3 B 27.2% $ 38.9 B 97.5% actual
1953 $ 48.1 B -20.2% $ 43.2 B 11.1% proj.
1954 l 41.2 - 14,L11 $ 45.4 L 5.1%R
(Source: Budget of the United States, FY1954.)
President Eisenhower took office determined to cut defense
spending and balance the budget.
Eisenhower cut Truman's request for new spending by nearly
$10 billion, the bulk of the savings coming from defense
(Ambrose, 1984, pp. 70-71).
The service chiefs and Europeans objected to the troop
reductions, just as in the 1990's, but the public supported
Eisenhower's defense program reduction plans.
TABLE 16. PUBLIC VIEW OF EISENHOWER CUTS
cut defense? agree disagree n/a
May 1953 65 % 26% 9 %
cut too much? yes no n/a
July 1953 17 % 55% 28 %
defense budget too big? too small? just right? n/a
Segt. 1953 20 1 22 ! 45 %- 13
(Source: Gallup, 1953, pp. 1144, 1158, 1170)
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C. 1954: FY1955 BUDGET
President Eisenhower's first budget message called for the
"strengthening of our military posture, and "greater efficiency
and economy" in defense spending (Budget, FY1955, p. M7). Where
President Truman 's budget messages focused on national security,
President Eisenhower's focused on the finance side of government,
and an efficient defense via three main elements:
1. reorganization for joint and combined operations;
2. replace conventional forces with strategic nuclear forces;
3. increased air power, including missile research.
Underlying these was a "new concept" for planning and funding
defense, one that eliminated strategic planning based on "assumed
fixed dates of maximum danger." The words recalled Truman's 1949
call for sustainable forces.
This budget is aimed instead at providing a strong
military position that can be maintained over the extended
period of uneasy peace (Budget, FY1955, p. M38).
President Eisenhower's "New Look" defense program was opposed by
the State Department and both ends of the political spectrum
(Ambrose, 1984, pp. 223-5). However, the public retained
confidence in the President, with 64 percent believing the
military "better prepared" for war than before (Gallup, 1954, p.
1274).
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D. 1955: FY1956 BUDGET
The FY1956 budget message claimed to have "successfully made
the adjustment from a wartime to a peacetime type of
economy.... ", with benefits in reduced defense and total outlays.
Eisenhower asked to maintain Truman's excise taxes to pay for
defense. Avoiding dramatic moves, Eisenhower made incremental
adjustments to keep funding down. He planned to reduce active
duty strength from 3.2 to 3 million by June 30, 1953, and 2.8
million by June 30, 1956. Lower overall troop strength allowed
increases in pay and benefits without additional spending.
Not all accounts were cut. The Air Force was the only
service whose personnel level increased. His budget provided for
more "airpower than ever before in peacetime...." (Budget,
FY1956, p. MS) The majority of the defense budget was going
towards air power programs. These accounts stimulated the
economy directly and technology advances indirectly.
In October, 1956 the Suez Crisis fueled calls for rearming,
but Eisenhower resisted U.S. involvement. The public approved
and doubled his victory margin in the November election.
E. FY1956-1960 BUDGETS
President Eisenhower kept defense budgets and programs
relatively stable through the end of the decade. (Figure 31
through 35) Expenditures for atomic power, missiles, and
continental defenses increased, and conventional forces were
modestly cut. Though crises occurred, his defense program was
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"successfully reoriented to the changing nature of the threat..."
(Budget, FY1957, p. M38) In 1957 the Soviets launched Sputnik
and the Gaither Report claimed American defenses were inadequate.
Eisenhower faced new pressure to increase defense spending from
all quarters, but he kept to his program.
Later budgets requested increases for force modernization,
making the military an attractive career, the nuclear carrier
program and increasing the reserves to 1.1 million. By the
FY1958 budget, President Eisenhower could claim success in
solving the power equation defined in Chapter II.
Today, almost 12 years after World War II, the United
States has demonstrated that it is possible to sustain a
high employment economy independent of war and continually
unbalanced Federal budgets (Budget, FY1958, p. M6).
The FY1959 budget called for increases of $1.3 billion
immediately and $ 2.5 billion in 1959 for missile and other
procurement, reflecting concerns over the Soviet Union. These
were partially offset by $ 2.8 billion decreases in other
accounts.
The FY1960 budget predicted a continued need for large
defense programs "...in an era of world trouble and unrest."
(Budget, FY1960, p. M6) Approximately 59 percent of federal
spending was going to national security programs, yet President
Eisenhower ended his term with warnings against unbalancing the
power equation by excessive defense spending. His caution
against the "military-industrial complex" became the center of
the guns-versus-butter debate.
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TABLE 17. POST-KOREAN DEFENSE SPENDING, BILLIONS OF NOMINAL $
FY BA t chq Outlay t chq
1952 60574 --- 38967 ---
1953 53012 -12.48t 47564 22.06t
1954 34374 -35.16V 40336 -15.20V
1955 30787 -10.44t 35532 -11.91V
1956 33187 7.80V 35791 0.731
1957 36255 9.24t 38439 7.401
1958 36747 1.36% 39062 1.62V
1959 42683 16.15t 43573 11.55t
1960 41959 -1.701 42824 -1.721
1961 43106D& 2.73t 44E676 4.321
TABLE 18. POST-KOREAN DEFENSE SPENDING, BILLIONS OF 1982 $
FY BA t chq Outlay t chq
1952 312559 --- 201068 ---
1953 255973 -14.31 229667 18.07%
1954 160551 -37.31 188398 -17.92t
1955 139941 -12.81 161509 -13.52V
1956 143853 2.81 155141 0.72!
1957 150937 4.91 160029 6.89k
1958 143937 -4.61 153004 1.591
1959 160765 11.71 164117 10.35%
1960 154945 -3.61 158139 -1.75t
1961 156406 0.9% 1621Q3_
(Source: Budget of the United States, FY 1952--1961.)
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Figure 31. Post-Korea Defense Spending
(Source: Budget of the United States, FY 1952-1961.)
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Figure 32. Post-Korea Defense Spending, Constant $
(Souirce: Budget of the United States, FY 1952--1961.)
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TABLE 19. POST-KOR•AN DOD MAZING
ea active reserve
1952 3,605,000 --- 515,000 ---
1953 3,536,000 -1.93% 732,000 42.22%
1954 3,200,000 -9.50% 697,000 -4.80%
1955 2,935,000 -8.30% 851,000 22.12%
1956 2,806,000 -4.40% 952,000 11.87%
1957 2,795,000 -0.38% 1,071,000 12.50%
1958 2,600,000 -6.98% 1,025,000 -4.28%
1959 2,503,000 -3.72% 1,062,000 3.55%
1960 2,475,000 -1.12% 1,073,000 1.05%
196 2,482.00 0.27 1.0860 1.24
TABLE 20. POST-KOREAN USN MANNING
year active t chg reserve t chq
1952 817,000 --- 126,000 ---
1953 794,000 -2.78% 136,000 7.96%
1954 733,000 -7.73% 139,000 2.37%
1955 661,000 -9.86% 149,000 7.14%
1956 670,000 1.40% 150,000 0.70%
1957 667,000 -0.42% 163,000 8.83%
1958 641,000 -3.91% 154,000 -5.59%
1959 626,000 -2.29% 1Z0,000 -15.75%
1960 618,000 -1.33% 133,000 2.08%
1991 ULU00 1.46 la 1138.000 1 .99t
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Figure 33. Post-Korea DOD Mann~ing
(Source: Budget of the United States, FY 1952--1961.)
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Figure 34. Post-Korea USN Maning
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Figure 35. Post-Korea Ships
(Source: Jane's Fighting Ships, 1953--1961.)
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V. SCORING THE POST-KOREAN REDUCTION
The stability of the post-Korean period defense structure is
shown by contrasting the budgets with the active duty personnel
levels. (Figure 36) From the 1953 war peak of 3.7 million,
manning declines in a gradual, smooth slope to a 1960 level of
2.5 million. Decreases in active duty personnel were partially
offset by growth in the reserves. Net military personnel went
from 4,120,000 to 3,568,000, down only 13 t. Total Navy manning
fell 20.4 percent. The total active fleet fell by a third, but
combatants were stable, 408 at the peak to 376 at the trough.
While these gradual decreases in force structure continued,
defense budgets increased in a similarly incremental fashion.
Thus, quality was kept high and hollow forces were avoided, while
real spending was level and cuts were relatively proportional.
TABLE 21. POST-KOREA SCORECARD
peak......... .trouqh ...... .. chq rate 1989-97
DOD $ 1952 $313B 1960 $155B -519 -6.3t -48%
USN $ 1952 $84B 1960 $39B -54V -6.7V -53V
DOD man. 1952 3685K 1960 2475K -331 -4.11 -361
USN man. 1952 817K 1960 618K -24t -3.01; -331;
shi 1953 41960 326 -1 -1.11 -401
(Note: Budget outlays in constant 1982 dollars.)
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0. S=G)ARY
The emergency nature of the Korean War, coming so soon after
World War II, left man. Americans fearful of being unprepared,
and added to the tensions of the Cold War. As with the post-
World War II period, inmnediately after the war's end there was a
rapid and significant reduction in defense funding, 64 percent,
and force structure. Then, President Eisenhower's steady hand on
the economic engine and defense trigger kept reactions from
boiling over, and allowed him to hold defense forces and spending
level in real terms throughout his two terms. This stability
contrasts with the wild fluctuations of the post-World War II
period, and reflected a changed view of peacetime mobilization
requirements. America could not return to a pre-1940 military,
but neither should it over spend on defense. The next two
administrations took more aggressive postures that culminated in
Vietnam and public disdain for the military. Chapter VI.
discusses the resulting post-Vietnam drawdown and hollow force.
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VI. POST-VIETNAM
This chapter seeks to identify parallels in the current
drawdown to the post-Vietnam whollow force" as defined in Chapter
II. The post-Vietnam drawdown occurred among political turmoil,
and under three politically weak Presidents, who faced arduous
economic conditions. A chronology of the fiscal year defense
budgets demonstrates that economics and politics drove defense
budgets more than strategic concerns. The scoring for the
reductions identifies a relationship between defense budgets and
force levels that allowed a hollow force to develop.
K. FY1973, NIXON
The high water mark for U.S. military activity in Vietnam
was 1968, with defense outlays of $215 billion 1982 dollars, and
a half million troops in country. From that point, budgets
declined as troops were withdrawn, making this drawdown unique in
beginning before the end of the conflict. President Nixon had
promised to end the war, and the Congress ensured attainment of
that goal through reduced defense appropriations. Nixon's FY1971
defense request was cut by Congress $2.1 billion, and the FY1972
request by $3 billion. By 1973, defense budgets had shrunk to 32
percent of government expenditures, and President Nixon hoped to
concentrate on domestic matters.
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Our reduction of 480,000 men from Vietnam allows for the
first time spending more on HEW than Defense (B:dget,
FY1973, p. 9).
While cutting defense overall, the budget did request $6.3
billion to increase strategic and naval programs.
[requests] a major increase in shipbuilding, reflecting
the high priority I place upon modernizing our naval forces
(Budget, FY1973, p. 17).
Congress passed the War Powers Act and set spending limits for
defense of Southeast Asia.
B. FY1974, NIXON
The FY1974 budget hoped to merely "keep defense in line."
(Budget, FY1974, p. 15) Polling found 44 percent of the public
thought there was "too much" spending on the military (Gallup,
1974, p. 362). The most expensive part of the Nixon defense
program would be the change to the all volunteer force (AVF),
necessitated by the politically unacceptable draft. The AVF
required doubling of pay scales to attract volunteers, and the
budget message projected an increase in total national defense
outlays from $76.4 billion in 1973 to $81.1 billion in 1974, and
$85.5 billion in 1975, attributed primarily to these pay
increases. The administration planned to achieve the AVF with
74% fewer active duty personnel than 1968, at an estimated $3
billion cost, while using size reductions to offset modernization
costs.
The Nixon budgets defended defense spending levels using
percentage-of-budget measures, contrasting essentially level
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defense outlays against substantial increases in total and non-
defense spending. This was the 1991 Bush-Cheny defense effort
without the pitchfork chart.
C. FY1975, NIXON
For FY1975, the budget provided for national defense at only
29 percent of total expenditures, though there were still some
increases for defense programs. President Nixon's arguments were
much like those of other President's during drawdowns: re-telling
how much had been previously cut, and arguing against further
cuts.
... 36 percent fewer men in arms than 1968, costs down in
constant dollars, but up in nominal dollars to keep
readiness and modernization (Budget, FY1974, p. 41).
The President requested supplemental appropriations, and employed
percentage-of-GNP illustrations to show declining defense
outlays, then below six percent.
Table 23 and Figures 37 and 38 illustrate the Nixon defense
requests and the extent to which they were cut by Congress. The
actual amounts in later years reflect the inflation of the Ford
and Carter administrations. As shown, Nixon attempted to
maintain level defense spending in the Eisenhower mold with
smaller, high quality forces, including unpopular base closures.
However, the Watergate affair removed his political power and
Congress took control of the defense budget issues.
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TABLE 22. NIXON DEFDNSE BUDGET RZQURSTS
nominal $, billions
yr actuals V chg FY73 %chg FY74 %chg FY75 I chg
72 $75
73 $73 -2.5% $78 -6.4%
74 $78 5.9% $81 -4.3%
75 $85 9.5% $86 -0.6% $85 0.6%
constant 1982 $, billions
yr actuals V chg FY73 %chg FY74 %chg FY75 % chg
72 $172
73 $157 -8.5% $168 -6.4%
74 $152 -3.2% $159 -4.3%
75 $150 -1.6% $151 -0.6% $149 0.6%
(Source: Budget of the United States, FY 1973--1975.)
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Figure 37. Nixon Defense Requests
(Source: Budget of the United States, FY 1973--1975.)
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NIXON DEFENSE BUDGET PROJECTIONS
constsaft 1982 dollars
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Figure 38. Nixon Defense Requests, Adjusted For Inflation
(Source: Budget of the United States, Fy 1973--1975.)
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D. FY1976, FORD
The FY1976 Ford defense budget request understandably had a
Nixon imprint and style. By 1976, only 27 percent of budget
outlays were slated for national defense, and President Ford
wanted to increase them, especially for the Navy.
In recent years the number navy of ships has decreased as
a result of retirement of many aging ships built during
World War. The savings have been used to strengthen the
combat capability of the remaining forces. (Budget, FY1975,
p. 13)
He requested increases in defense outlays from $85.3 billion in
1975 to $94 billion in 1976. A notable exception was his
proposal for reduced military retirement annuities.
E. FY1977, FORD
The FY1977 Ford budget had a stylistic change from Nixon,
but continued the recommendations for strong defense budgets,
even as he continued Nixon's detente initiatives. President
Ford's appeals for continued defense spending were direct.
I am recommending a significant increase in defense
spending for 1977 (Budget, FY1977, p. M5).
The President repeated the Truman and Eisenhower calls for
sustainable budgets, alluding to his experiences with the budget
process as a Congressman, As with theirs, his challenge went
unheeded by the Congress.
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1. FY1978, FORD
President Ford's olame ducku budget message recommended
renewed growth in national defense spending, now down to 26
percent of the budget. Following one of the perennial reviews of
maritime strategy and naval requirements, Ford introduced a
concept later associated with Reagan.
(The review] resulted in a decision to accelerate
modernization of the fleet, building toward a level of about
600 active ships by the 1990's (Budget, FY1978, p. 75).
Admittedly, this fleet would have included smaller carriers than
the ones procured under Reagan.
G. ROLE OF INFLATION
Inflation and high interest rates dominated the economic
news of the seventies, and made long-range budgeting very
difficult. (Figure 39) Where the Eisenhower terms had seen
inflation rates averaging 1.2 percent, the period 1968 to 1980
averaged 7.5 percent. Inflation was so great that Congressional
defense appropriations ultimately exceeded original requests by
Nixon, Ford and Carter, the very ones that had been rejected by
the Congress when proposed only a few years before. Figures 40
and 41 illustrate this to be true of the period 1976 through
1980, after which the Reagan buildup eclipsed those inflationary
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Figure 39. Post-Vietnam Period Inflation
(Source: Historical Tables, Budgets of the United States.)
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TAXLZ 23. FORD DEFPNSZ DUDGT RNQUESTS
nominal S. billions
yr actuals % chg FY76 % chg FY77 % chg FY78 % chg
75 $85
76 $88 3.5% $94 -6.4%
77 $96 8.8% $106 -9.3% $115 -16.7%
78 $103 7.6% $120 -14.5% $122 -15.8% $112 -8.3%
79 $115 11.7% $132 -12.5% $132 -12.8% $124 -7.1%
80 $133 15.5% $141 -6.1% $142 -6.2% $136 -2.6%
81 $156 17.5% $152 3.0% $148 5.3%
82 $183 17.2% $159 15.0%
constant 1982 $,_billions
yr actuals % chg FY76 % chg FY77 % chg FY78 % chg
75 $150
76 $144 -3.7% $154 -6.4%
77 $152 5.3% $168 -9.3% $182 -16.7%
78 $146 -3.6% $171 -14.5% $174 -15.8% $160 -8.3%
79 $151 3.0% $172 -12.5% $173 -12.8% $162 -7.1%
80 $157 4.2% $167 -6.1% $168 -6.2% $161 -2.6%
81 $167 6.4% $162 3.0% $159 5.3%
2 $1 _._ _ $159 15.0%(Source: Budget o the United States, FY 1976--1978.)
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Figure 40. Ford Defense Requests
(Source: Budget of the United States, FY 1976--1978.)
iii










140 I I I I
76 77 78 79 80 81 82
P FY76 0 FT77 A FY78 - actxals
Figure 41. Ford Defense Requests
(Source: Budget of the United States, FY 1976--1978.)
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B. FY1979, CARTER
National defense was down to 24 percent of federal spending
by 1979. Despite an attempt to "zero-base" the federal budget,
overall spending rose to half a trillion dollars under President
Carter while defense declined. Appealing to both views on
defense budgets, he defined his approach as both a cut and an
increase: a three percent real growth, but eight percent below
previous projections.
... I am restraining defense expenditures by introducing
important efficiencies and by placing careful priorities
upon our defense needs (Budget, FY1979, p. 5).
... [to] maintain the current basic force structure and
increase real spending (Budget, FY1979, p. 66).
Despite the President's intentions, inflation exceeded forecasts
and undercut both his three percent real growth and efficiencies.
(Figure 42 and 43)
I. FY1980, CARTER
In his second budget President Carter held national defense
to 24 percent of spending, and again planned for three percent
real growth in defense, based on requests for consistent six to
nine percent nominal increases. Inflation hit 13 percent that
year, the highest since 1947, resulting in more real cuts for
defense. In contrast to defense budgets, Congress had previously
mandated automatic indexing for many non-defense programs and
transfer payments, and their inflation adjustments took an ever
increasing share of the budget pie.
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The Iranian hostage crisis and Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan gave President Carter reason to reflect on the trend
of defense spending. As had President Truman, his views of
national security requirements evolved in office. Faced with a
changing view of Soviet intentions and the aggressive defense
position taken by the Reagan campaign, he raised defense requests
for FYl981.
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TABLE 24. CARTER DEFENSE BUDGET REQUESTS
nominal $. billions
yr actuals % chg FY79 % chg FY80 V chg
78 $103
79 $115 11.7% $118 -2.4%
80 $133 15.5% $129 3.3% $126 5.6%
81 $156 17.5% $139 12.1% $137 13.9%
82 $183 17.1% $151 21.4% $148 23.3%
83 $205 12.1% $163 26.1% $158 29.8%
84 $221 7.7% $169 30.8%
constant 1982 dollars
yr actuals % chg FY79 % chg FY80 % chg
78 $146
79 $151 3.0% $154 -2.4%
80 $157 4.2% $152 3.3% $149 5.6%
81 $167 6.4% $149 12.1% $147 13.9%
82 $183 9.3% $151 21.4% $148 23.3%
83 $197 7.5% $156 26.1% $151 29.8%
(Source: Budget of the United States, FY 1979--1980.)
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Figure 42. Carter Defense Requests
(Source: Budget of the United States, FY 1979--1980.)
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Fegure 43. Carter Defense Requests, Adjusted For Inflation
(Source: Budget of the United States, FY 1979--1980.)
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J. SCORING THE POST-VIZTNAN REDUCTION
The post-Vietnam drawdown began while troops were still
engaged in combat. After the fighting had ended, Congress cut
and restricted defense spending, and continued that course
through the seventies. The Nixon, Ford and Carter
administrations all saw military forces as a card to be played in
their strategic arms control negotiations. They kept manning
higher than required for any crisis short of World War III, and
higher than they were politically able to get Congress to
sustain. It was acknowledged that the all volunteer force would
cost more than a conscript force, but Congress did not continue
the funding increases after 1973. They cut severely from the
Nixon and Ford requests. President Carter's defense budgets were
increased by Congress, but those increases were decimated by
inflation. Congressman Dellums has pointed to this insufficient
funding relative to troop levels, and cuts made from a depleted
readiness condition following the Vietnam effort, as the cause of
the hollow force.
... the attempt to retain more force structure than can
be supported with available resources is a sure recipe for
'hollow forces' .... (Dellums, July 1993, p. 1).
Casual comparison of the reduction percentages in manning, ships
and funding for the period as employed in Chapters III., IV., and
V. does not support the point. Funding reductions, adjusted for
inflation, were not greater than cuts in force structure, as
shown in Figures 44 through 48.
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The key to the hollow force is found in the reduction of
funding relative to a higher, theoretical baseline required to
support the AVF. Figure 49 compares Navy manning to spending,
along with the ratio between them. It shows that funding was
increased as the forces were reduced, until 1973. Then funding,
measured in constant dollars, decreased at a faster rate then
force levels, as highlighted by the ratio curve. When the
measures of drawdown are made against AVF costs, and not the
lower cost of the conscripted Vietnam troops, Congressman
Dellums' point is validated: the hollow force did result from
under-funding force levels.
Chapter VII. will further develop this line of reasoning in
support of the earlier assertion in Chapter II that the real
purpose of the Reagan buildup in funding was to sustain the
quality of the forces, not dramatically increase their size.
Final comparison will be made among the four periods' reductions,
and the limits on cross period comparisons are summarized and















0 I I I I I I I I I
69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 ?7 79 SO
FY
Figure 44. Post-V itnam Defense Spending
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Figure 45. Post-Vietnam Defense Spending, Adjusted For
Inflation
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Figure 46. Post-Vietnam DOD Maniing














0 ' I I I I I I I I I t
68 69 70 71 72 73 ?4 75 76 77 78 79 80 81
a actIve + reserve
Figure 47. Post-Vietnam Navy Manning
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Figure 48. Post-Vietnam Ships
(Source: Jane's Fighting Ships, 1968--1980.)
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USN MANNING / SPENDING RATIO
manning x1000. spending 1982 billions
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Figure 49. The Source of the Hollow Force
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
Chapter I. identified three questions to be addressed in
this research.
1. What was the nature and extent of the drawdowns?
2. How were they similar and different?
3. What lessons do they offer for the current drawdown?
This chapter provides analysis and conclusions for those
three questions. Specifically, it recaps the previous individual
examination of the four drawdown periods and summarizes the
essence of their respective natures. It compares them thorough
composite measurements to identify the important contrasts and
similarities among them. Comparisons are also made to general
fiscal and economic indicators during the reduction periods. The
finding that inflation and the under-funding of the all volunteer
force were causes of the hollow force forces is restated. The
Presidential role in the power equation is revisited, along with
a conclusion about their respective performances. The chapter
ends by applying these conclusions to the current drawdown,
summarizing conclusions as to the three research questions, and
recommending future research.
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A. ESSZNEc OF REDUCTION
The post-World War II demobilization was rapid, severe,
oscillating and short-lived. Initially bi-partisan, it became a
political battle when world events changed President Truman's
views of defense requirements. The hope of returning to a pre-
war defense posture ended, as concerns over those world events
caused the reversal of the drawdown.
The post-Korea drawdown also began rapidly, but under
President Eisenhower was tightly controlled, and coupled to
cohesive economic and strategic strategies. Those policies were
sustained over his two terms, despite world crises. Essentially,
this period was neither a drawdown nor buildup, but rather a
smooth transition from war-time mobilization to sustained Cold
War readiness.
The post-Vietnam demobilization was driven by reaction to
the failures of that conflict, and political turmoil. It
extended over three administrations, and was conducted by
Congress over Presidential objections. The nature of this
drawdown is complicated by the simultaneous switch to the all
volunteer force, and the high inflation of the period. President
Carter's efforts to end the drawdown were undercut by thcsc
factors.
The post-Cold War drawdown has been pushed by reduced
strategic demands and pulled by increased economic demands.
Ironically, Congress forced reduction on President Bush, yet may
now restrain President Clinton from further reductions. The rate
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and degree of reduction have been moderate, but have already
continued longer than previous drawdowns, and will probably
exceed them in the ultimate floor attained.
D. CCQPOS ITS 3ZJUR?3ITS
Using DOD active duty manning at fiscal year's end, Figure
50 provides the composite measure for force levels. The
measurements begin at each conflict's peak year, and end at the
first up-turn in manning levels. They reveal that, compared to
the prior three demobilizations, the current evolution began from
a lower level, is more gradual, and will be of longer duration.
If stated intentions play out and present trends continue, the
post-Cold War military will.be smaller in people than any since
before World War II. It remains to be seen whether it will level
out just below the post-war floor of 1.4 million personnel, or
continue to an even lower level commensurate with the "View ONE"
concept which predominated before the 1940's. Figure 51 uses
defense outlays, presented in constant 1982 dollars, to compare
the four reduction periods. Here, the current period begins from
a level of funding higher than either Korea or Vietnam. As
discussed in Chapter VI, this level is notably higher in per-
force level unit-ratios, and can be attributed to the higher cost
of the AVF, and "techflation" creep in modern weapon system
procurement cost. Beyond those factors, the current reduction is
at a faster annual rate and will end below any previous period,
except those immediately after World War II.
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rate and will end below any previous period, except those
immediately after World War II.
Figure 52 portrays an alternative illustration of peak-to-
trough defense spending during the drawdowns. Using the official
FY1994 budget projections from the Clinton administration, this
illustration supports Congressman Dellums' point that there are
less severe and dramatic reductions ongoing in defense budgets
than previous drawdowns (Dellums, 1993, p. 1) However, analysis
of these kinds of projections should consider the increased
demands for the AVF not present in the three prior earlier
periods, as discussed in Chapter VI and preceding paragraph.
Combining the results of these measurements finds that the
current drawdown is more pronounced than previous ones in funding
and less pronounced in force levels. That is the prescription
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Figure 50. Comparison of Drawdowns in Manning
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Figure 51. Post-Conflict Defense Spending Comparison
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Figure 52. Post Conflict Defense Spending, Peak to Trough
(Source: Budgets of the United States, FY 1950--1994.)
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C. ECONOKIC INDICATORS
As noted in Chapter III.'s repetition of Senator Nunn's
"blanks" speech, the economic portion of the power equation has
driven the post-Cold War drawdown. While some may prefer that
defense budgets be policy driven, during post-conflict periods it
is economics which matters in budgetary decisions. Figures 53
through 55 examine and illustrate the common economic and fiscal
indicators for the four drawdown periods. The periods are
defined as beginning in the first year of reduced defense
spending, and ending at the first increase, measured in constant
1982 dollars. Because these indicators are affected by far more
than just defense spending and employments levels, it is unwise
to make attribution to causes without a more in-depth research
than this effort. However, it is interesting to consider whether
the results support generally held perceptions regarding the
effects of reduced military expenditures.
Figure 53 illustrates the cumulative effect on GNP during
the drawdowns, showing that it grew less during the more intense
reductions, and more during the more gradual drawdowns. Figure
54 indicates that average unemployment was higher during the more
recent and gradual reductions. Similarly, Figure 55. also shows
higher inflation for those periods. These measurements suggest
little in the way of relationships among productivity, employment
and inflation during post-conflict defense drawdowns. They do
add to the questions about whether such links are established.
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Figure 53. GNP During Defense Drawdownu
(Source: Statistical Abstract of the U.S.)
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Figure 54. Unemployment During Defense Drawdowns
(Source: Statistical Abstract of the U. S.)
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Figure 55. Inflation During Defense Drawdowna
(Source: Statistical Abstract of the U.S.)
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D. BUDGZTARY EFFECTS
There is much political debate about defense spending;
whether it increases deficits, and whether reducing it will
provide money for other purposes. The latter case is termed the
"peace dividend", and leads to further debate over whether the
dividend will be spent on non-defense programs or to balance
budgets. Figures 56 through 57 address these issues.
Figure 56 indicates that in earlier drawdowns Truman and
Eisenhower cut total spending along with defense. Truman had net
surpluses during his defense reductions and Eisenhower had
balanced budgets. The only dividend was that the taxpayers were
less burdened, as available resources were directed towards
balancing the budget. After Vietnam, and to date in the current
drawdown, non-defense outlays increased more than defense
reductions. The results are shown in Figure 57. Both post-
Vietnam and especially the current drawdown have been attended by
explosions in debt level. In fact, because defense spending was
being financed through debt, there were no resources to be re-
directed. These effects are further illustrated as a percentage
of GNP in Figure 58. The conclusion is that defense reductions
have not resulted in reduced spending. Figure 59 contrasts the
reduction in defense budgets against total government spending,
and the resulting difference is termed the peace dividend. When
so defined, contrary to some rhetoric the dividend appears to be
a recent phenomena, and tied to deficit spending.
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Figure 56. Total Government Outlays During Defense Drawdowns
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Figure 57. Federal Debt Incurred During Defense Dravdowns
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Figure 58. Debt an % of GNP During Defense Drawdowns
(Source: Historical Tables, Budget of the United States,
1994.)
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post-conflict period DOD vs total govt
net change
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Figure 59. *Peace Dividends", Calculated as Net Difference in
Defense and Total Government Outlays
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X. CONTR.ATS AND SIMILARITIES
It is necessary to acknowledge the importance of the
preceding conflict in analysis of the follow-on drawdown; without
the conflict there would be no buildup, and no impetus to reduce.
Among the factors which clearly affect the post-conflict
reduction are: the severity of combat; whether the military
effort was popular; whether there was a clear end to hostilities;
and whether the end was achieved through victory or stalemate.
Each of the four conflicts discussed differed in these regards,
and subsequently in the level of mobilization and drawdown.
Chapter VI. argued that the composition of forces, whether
career volunteers or a citizen army, shaped the demobilization.
This is particularly true in contrasting the current reduction
against the three earlier periods. Associated with this factor
is the rate of reduction, rapid after World War II and Korea, and
gradual after Vietnam and now. The contrast among the periods is
greatest in the rate of drawdown. Where the earlier periods saw
near total accomplishment of their troop reductions in two years,
Vietnam was unique in its demobilization, commencing during the
height of combat, and extending over six years. The current
reduction in personnel began in 1988 and is scheduled to continue
at least ten years, through 1997.
The scale of the reductions has been closer, discounting the
great scale of World War II. From peak height to the ultimate
floor has varied only modestly for funding in constant dollars,
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people and combatant ships. This is not necessarily true of the
i floor, which was often lower in Congress. The decline
towards that floor has ended under differing circumstances. The
post-World War II drawdown was ended in reaction to Soviet
aggression. The post-Korean drawdown period, initially rapid,
was then more a level plateau than reduction, and it continued
until the Kennedy administration took a more aggressive stance
towards the Communists. After Vietnam there was a strong peace
movement and many elements would have taken the cuts towards a
lower floor. The actual level resulted from fights between the
administrations and Congress, and inflation. The current
reduction is more complex in the political sphere. Having forced
reduction on a reluctant President Bush, substantially the same
legislators may restrain the new administration in their cutting,
to avoid the economic pains of cutting defense infrastructure.
Of the similarities among the periods, the most important
may be the competitive nature of the process. Participants
divide into those who push cuts and those who resist cuts.
Congress has generally played the former role, the exception
being the heyday of the Cold War in the 1950's, at the height of
the "Red Scare." As detailed in Chapter V., after Korea the
roles reversed and the President fought to keep defense budgets
down. It is interesting that Eisenhower, playing the restrainer,
was the sole President during drawdown periods to generally
accomplish his budgetary goals, while President's Truman, Nixon,
Ford, Carter and Bush had to compromise with Congress. The
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definition of success in this case is that Presidential defense
requests were granted by Cungress. Viewed as a struggle between
the branches, the score is: Presidents, one win, and Congress
three wins. Viewed as a struggle among those who sought
reductions and those who resisted reduction, the score is:
cutters four wins and no losses.
F. LESSONS FOR TODAY
The current debate centers around the United States having a
smaller but higher quality military. All wish to avoid a return
to the hollow forces experienced after Vietnam. They were caused
by insufficient funding relative to force levels, primarily due
to the transition to the AVF and inflation. While the conditions
are different -- the AVF is established and inflation is low --
the lessons of that period apply today. Quality will require
more, not less, funding per unit of force structure. The costs
of the kinds of forces envisioned in Secretary Aspin's plans are
high and permanent, and will be driven higher by the competitive
requirements of attracting, retaining and training the AVF, and
by technology. The old formula of a citizen military, with its
low cost during peacetime, and augmentation in response to
crisis, does not fit the new strategy. To this end, there is
reason for concern in such recent trends towards withholding
military pay raises, reduced promotion opportunity, and lower
status in a military career.
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Presidents are constitutionally and electorally responsible
for solving the power equation. The power equation needs one
clear, consistent solution, not a committee report. If Congress
dominates the debate, compromise and competing demands may result
in defense policy, force structure and budgets that are
incoherent and inconsistent. Eisenhower and Reagan achieved
their defense programs, while Truman, nixon, Ford, Carter and
Bush did not. Eisenhower was the one to achieve success in a
post-conflict period, and he was uniquely positioned in
experience and popularity. Only strong Presidential leadership
will bring Congress and the nation to pay for continued high
quality military forces. This is another area of concern in the
current drawdown, which began with Congress having the upper hand
over President Bush, and perceptions of inexperience in President
Clinton. The lesson is that the President must lead the defense
drawdown.
More than incremental differences in direction, it is
important that post-conflict defense policy be consistent, and
that budgets act in concert with policy. This means that
Congress must resist cutting "painless" defense accounts,
personnel and operations, and keep funding in balance with force
levels. The personnel-budget ratio will have to get better as
force levels decline. Here, too, there is cause for concern.
Defense budgets have provided the primary source for reductions
in the fiscal year 1994 budget. In future years, it will be
necessary to continue base reductions and weapon system
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cancellations if the balance between force levels and funding is
to be maintained. The challenge enunciated by Truman and
repeated by Eisenhower and Ford, that the nation find and
maintain a sustainable force level, is more important than ever
G. CONCLUSIONS
Prior to the Eisenhower administration, there was a general
expectation that conflicts would be followed by demobilization to
pre-conflict defense levels. Because of that philosophy, America
was unprepared for all its major conflicts, and had to react to
with crisis mobilization and increased defense budgets. Both
World War II and Korea saw full war-time mobilization and
funding, and both were followed by periods of rapid
demobilization and immediate defense budget cuts. In that
respect they differ greatly from the current drawdown, which has
proceeded at a more gradual rate.
During the early days of the Cold War, from 1955 to the
Vietnam conflict, President Eisenhower kept force levels and
defense budgets relatively stable, at higher than pre-war levels,
but lower than many political elements demanded. Defense policy
was stable, and reductions in defense budgets were incremental
rather than radical, with personnel reduced more than funding.
After Vietnam, the all volunteer force replaced the draft,
and defense budgets were expected to rise on a per-unit basis as
required to support higher manning costs and technological
innovation. Defense expenditures did rise, but during the high
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inflation of the 1970's increases were insufficient in real terms
to sustain readiness. "Hollow forces" resulted.
The Reagan defense buildup increased spending more than
force levels. While there was no doubt some inefficiency in the
spending, defense readiness did improve. Unfortunately, the
buildup was funded through deficits.
In the current drawdown, defense spending will decline 47
percent in real terms. Manning will be cut less, only 35
percent. Theoretical mission requirements have been eliminated
or reduced, but actual tasking and employment of forces has not
visibly decreased. If these trends continue, imbalance between
funding and force levels similar to those of the post-Vietnam
conflict could reoccur.
This research has led to conclusions regarding the three
thesis questions. They are made with the understanding that
the nature of post-conflict defense drawdowns is inherently
political, competitive, and fiscal. The debate flows from two
sources: the executive--legislative competition, and a
philosophical divide between the two views of readiness outlined
in Chapter II. In the end, it is competition for resources that
drives budget decisions.
First, President Eisenhower was uniquely successful among
post-conflict Presidents in maintaining the balance between force
levels and funding during post-conflict drawdowns. Second, the
post-Vietnam "hollow forces" occurred when funding was
insufficient in the face of inflation to sustain the change to
147
the all volunteer force. Third, early signs in the current
reduction point to the possibility of similar difficulties in
balancing reductions in forces and budgets. Though a not an
objective, the research concludes that the Reagan buildup's
success lay in quality improvements more than quantity increases.
3. RZCOMMDATIONS FOR FUTURZ RESZACH.
A primary interest of the research was the cause of hollow
forces. The research has pointed to several areas where
additional research and analysis would provide greater
understanding in budgeting for reduced force levels. Because we
are headed towards the smallest force in over 50 years, the ratio
between funding for personnel accounts and active duty forces is
worthy of closer examination. More detailed analysis could test
the hypothesis that the all volunteer force was in fact under-
funded in the post-Vietnam period.
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